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MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

An Economy That Reaches Every Family

A strong nation is built when honest work is rewarded and growth reaches ordinary families, not only the few. The Patriotic People’s Party stands for sustainable economic growth grounded in peace, justice and good governance, where markets are open, public money is accounted for, and the rule of law protects every trader, farmer and worker. When South Sudanese stand as one people and one nation, united beyond tribalism, we can build roads, schools and clinics, create jobs for our youth, and share prosperity fairly across every state. Democracy, transparency and accountability must guide how resources are used, so that oil, land and labour serve the whole nation and no community is left behind. On this Sunday, I call on every South Sudanese to hold fast to that vision — an economy that works for all, in a peaceful and united South Sudan.

— Dr. Joseph Makuer Nyieth, Chairman, Patriotic People's Party

TODAY'S LEAD STORY

ELECTIONS —

South Sudan Postpones First National Elections to 11 February 2027

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Reuters



President Salva Kiir (Photo: USAID, public domain)

South Sudan has postponed its first national elections since independence, moving presidential and parliamentary polling from 22 December 2026 to Thursday, 11 February 2027, in a revised timetable issued by the National Elections Commission on Saturday, 14 November. Commission spokesperson Josephine Achiro Fortelo confirmed the new date to Reuters, saying it followed consultations with stakeholders. The announcement, published on the commission's official Facebook page on the day voter registration was due to begin, is the latest delay to a vote first planned for 2022, then moved to December 2024 and then to December 2026, and it extends a transitional period that was already due to end on 22 February 2027 by only eleven days after polling.

The revised calendar sets out the steps that must now happen in a compressed sequence. Voter registration is scheduled from 14 to 28 November across 3,161 centres in the ten states and three administrative areas, with a provisional register due on 29 November and a final register in January. Candidate nominations are scheduled in December, campaigning is to run for forty-five days from 27 December to 9 February, 10 February is designated as a silence day, counting is to begin on polling day, and final results are scheduled for 15 February with publication the following day. A long period for resolving election disputes runs into July. Commission chair Gabriel Bol Deng has said more than 22,000 officials have been recruited for registration.

The commission did not give a specific reason for the postponement in its announcement, and that silence has itself become part of the story. In the days before the decision, the United Nations Security Council heard warnings that conditions for a credible vote in December were not in place. On 10 November, Anita Kiki Gbeho, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, told the Council the country was approaching a critical stage in its political transition. A United Nations human rights commission had warned in September that safeguards for credible and peaceful elections were lacking, and African Union officials had called for the transition to end in February without further extensions.

South Sudan became independent from Sudan in July 2011 but has never held a national election. Its politics since independence have been shaped by the rivalry between President Salva Kiir and former First Vice President Riek Machar, whose competing forces fought a civil war from 2013 that killed an estimated 400,000 people before a revitalised peace agreement in 2018 created a power-sharing transitional government. That agreement has been repeatedly extended. In September 2026, President Kiir dissolved the transitional government, the national legislature, state governments and their assemblies and established a caretaker administration to oversee the electoral period, a move that supporters presented as clearing the way for elections and critics presented as concentrating power.

Machar's position remains central to whether the February vote can be inclusive. He was placed under house arrest in March 2025 and remains detained while facing charges including treason, murder, conspiracy, terrorism and crimes against humanity in connection with fighting in Nasir, charges he denies. United Nations and African Union briefers have identified his detention and the exclusion of opposition groups from dialogue as factors complicating preparations, and opposition participation has been raised as a condition for a credible process. At the same time, the government has argued that further postponements risk prolonging transitional governance indefinitely, and the commission's new date keeps polling inside the February deadline rather than opening a new open-ended extension.

Money is another constraint that the extra fifty-one days do not by themselves resolve. Reporting on the Security Council briefing put the commission's funding at about twenty-one million dollars received against about two hundred and seventy-six million dollars requested to organise the

elections. Registration materials were reported to have reached state capitals but still needed distribution to individual centres, a logistical task made harder by poor roads, flooding in some areas, insecurity in others, and the fact that a large share of the population lacks government-recognised identification documents. Civic education, which the commission said the extra time would help support, must reach first-time voters who have never taken part in a national poll.

For ordinary South Sudanese, the postponement will be judged not by the calendar alone but by what changes between now and February. A credible register, nominations that allow genuine competition, a campaign period in which parties can move and speak safely, and a count that is transparent at polling-centre, state and national level are the tests that international observers and domestic civil society have repeatedly set. The new timetable provides dates for each of those steps, which makes it possible to measure progress publicly in the coming weeks. If registration proceeds visibly across the states and administrative areas, confidence may recover; if centres open late or materials do not arrive, pressure for another change will grow quickly.

The February date also carries symbolic weight. Fifteen years after independence, South Sudanese voters have waited through a civil war, a peace agreement and successive transitions for the chance to choose a national government. A vote held on 11 February, eleven days before the transitional period ends, would still allow a result to be declared before that deadline, but it leaves almost no margin for delay in counting or disputes.

(Source: Reuters)

(Source: Reuters)

SOUTH SUDAN

NATIONAL MOURNING —

President Kiir Leads Final Farewell to General Joseph Lagu in Juba

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Office of the President of South Sudan



President Salva Kiir (Photo: USAID, public domain)

President Salva Kiir led the final farewell to General Joseph Lagu Yanga in Juba this week, as South Sudan paid its last respects to one of the most recognisable figures of its liberation history. Prayers were held at All Saints Cathedral and Lagu was laid to rest at the Dr John Garang Mausoleum grounds, according to reporting of the 13 November ceremonies credited to the Office of the President. The farewell drew senior officials, diplomats and members of the public who had earlier been invited to sign a condolence book at the Parliament Building, open until the day before the burial, with Senior Presidential Envoy Adut Kiir joining the tributes during that period of mourning.

Lagu, who died on 27 October 2026, was remembered as a veteran politician and military commander whose career spanned the decades of struggle that preceded South Sudan's independence in 2011. His death prompted tributes well beyond government circles, reflecting a life that began long before the present republic existed and that connected the older liberation movement with the institutions of the new state. The decision to accord him a state burial in Juba, and to lay him to rest at the mausoleum grounds associated with Dr John Garang, placed his farewell at the symbolic centre of the nation's capital and of its official memory.

The ceremonies also intersected with the country's current political calendar in a direct and practical way. The Special Court trying former First Vice President Riek Machar and seven co-defendants adjourned its proceedings until 18 November to allow for Lagu's state burial, a scheduling decision recorded in reports of the court's 128th session at

Freedom Hall. That adjournment underlined how a national farewell of this scale draws in institutions across the state, from the presidency and parliament to the judiciary, and how public mourning and public business must be sequenced when a figure of Lagu's standing dies.

For many South Sudanese, occasions of this kind are moments to reflect on the distance between the aspirations of the liberation era and the challenges of the present. The generation that fought for self-determination is passing, and each state funeral becomes an occasion on which younger citizens hear, often in detail for the first time, accounts of the movements, negotiations and sacrifices that produced independence. Official tributes at the cathedral and at the graveside therefore serve two purposes at once: they honour an individual life, and they restate a national story at a moment when the country is preparing, after repeated delays, for its first national elections.

That connection between memory and the present transition was present throughout the week. The condolence book at Parliament, the cathedral prayers and the burial at the mausoleum grounds formed a sequence of public rituals in the capital, each open in a different way to officials and citizens. In a country where many families have their own memories of loss during the long conflicts, a state farewell conducted with order and dignity can offer a shared point of reference, even among people who disagree sharply about current politics. It is one of the few kinds of national occasion that is not, in itself, a contest between parties.

At the same time, South Sudan's political life did not pause for long. Election preparations, court proceedings and government business all resume immediately after the burial period, and the adjournment of the Machar trial to 18 November is a reminder that the calendar is crowded. The contrast is striking: a week devoted in part to honouring a liberation commander of an earlier generation, in the same month in which voter registration for the first elections in the republic's history is under way. The juxtaposition gives the farewell a significance beyond ceremony, as a marker of how far the state has come and how much of its promised democratic transition still lies ahead.

Diplomatic attendance at such farewells is also closely watched in Juba, because it signals the regard in which South Sudan's liberation history is held by its neighbours and partners. No detailed official list of foreign mourners was published in the reporting available for this edition, and this newspaper does not invent one. What is established is the domestic shape of the occasion: presidential leadership of the farewell, prayers at All Saints Cathedral, burial at the Dr John Garang Mausoleum grounds, and a condolence process at Parliament that preceded it. Those facts alone place the event among the most significant state ceremonies of the year.

As the mourning period closes, attention returns to the work Lagu's generation left unfinished in the eyes of many citizens: a permanent constitution, elected institutions and a peace that reaches beyond agreements signed in the capital. Honouring a liberation hero does not settle any of those questions, but it does remind political leaders, in public, of the standard against which they will be judged. In Juba this week, that reminder was delivered not in a speech about policy but in the oldest language of statehood, a funeral conducted by the republic for one of the men whose struggle made the republic possible.

(Source: Office of the President of South Sudan)

(Source: Office of the President of South Sudan)

EDUCATION —

Upper Nile Governor Reopens University of Upper Nile After 13 Years

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Eye Radio



Juba, South Sudan (Photo: Zamwan, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

The governor of Upper Nile State has reopened the University of Upper Nile after thirteen years, according to reporting by Eye Radio on 14 November, restoring a public university whose closure had become one of the most visible symbols of what South Sudan's conflict cost its education system. The reopening, reported as a headline development from the state, returns an institution that had been out of operation since the period when fighting that began in 2013 disrupted universities, schools and public services across the country. For students and families in Upper Nile, the announcement raises immediate practical questions about admissions, staffing, programmes and facilities, as well as a larger hope that higher education can again be pursued at home rather than only by leaving the state or the country.

Universities are unusually vulnerable in wartime. They concentrate young people, teachers and expensive equipment in one place, they depend on regular salaries and supplies,

and they cannot function when students and staff are displaced. South Sudan's universities suffered all of those pressures after 2013, and many students of that generation completed their studies late, abroad, or not at all. A closure lasting thirteen years therefore represents not a single interrupted academic year but an entire cohort, and more than one, whose opportunities were narrowed. Reopening a campus does not restore those lost years, but it does change what is possible for the students now finishing secondary school in Malakal and across Upper Nile.

The reopening also matters for the state administration itself. Upper Nile, like every South Sudanese state, needs teachers, nurses, agricultural extension workers, engineers and administrators, and it cannot import all of them indefinitely. A functioning university in the state shortens the distance between secondary school and professional training, keeps more education spending circulating locally, and gives public institutions a source of graduates who know the languages and conditions of the area. Those benefits take years to materialise, because a reopened university must rebuild academic departments, recruit lecturers, restore laboratories and libraries, and re-establish accreditation and examination systems that may have lapsed during closure.

No detailed reopening programme, enrolment figure or faculty list was published in the headline reporting available for this edition, and those specifics should be sought from the university and the state ministry as they are confirmed. What readers should watch for next is concrete evidence of teaching resuming: registration dates, the faculties that open first, arrangements for students whose earlier studies were interrupted, and support for female students and displaced students returning to the area. Announcements of reopenings are common in post-conflict settings; timetables, classrooms in use and examinations held are the measures that show an institution is truly back.

The wider education picture in South Sudan makes the stakes clear. Across the country, schools operate with shortages of trained teachers, learning materials and safe buildings, and in Sudan, as UNICEF reporting this month has shown for the region, war has destroyed textbooks and interrupted schooling on a massive scale. South Sudan's own children face displacement, flooding and poverty that keep many out of classrooms. Against that background, a university reopening is a counterpoint worth recording accurately and without exaggeration: one institution, in one state, returning after a long closure, in a system that still needs sustained investment at every level from primary school upwards.

There is also a peace dividend argument that state leaders often make for investments of this kind, and it deserves to be tested rather than simply repeated. Young people who can see a credible route from school to a qualification and a job have more to lose from a return to violence, and a university town creates employment and demand that benefit traders, transport operators and landlords as well as students. Malakal's recent history, including the handover of its displacement camp arrangements and the planned return of its state radio service reported elsewhere, suggests a broader effort to restore civic institutions in Upper Nile. Education, broadcasting and public health are the kinds of services whose return residents can verify in daily life.

Funding will determine whether the reopening endures. A campus needs recurrent money for salaries and maintenance, not only a ceremony and repairs, and South Sudan's public finances, dependent heavily on oil revenue that must travel through war-torn Sudan, are under severe strain. Partnerships with national government, development agencies and alumni can help, but they cannot substitute for a budget line that survives from year to year. The governor's role in reopening the university will therefore be judged over the coming academic terms by whether lecturers are paid, students remain enrolled and the institution's calendar runs without long interruptions.

For now, the fact itself should not be understated. Thirteen years is most of the lifespan of the republic, and a university that closed when South Sudan was two years old is opening again as the country prepares for its first national elections. Students who were small children when the campus closed could be among those who register. If the University of Upper Nile can hold classes, run examinations and graduate a first new cohort, it will have given Upper Nile something the conflict took away for more than a decade: a place, at home, where the next generation of professionals is made.

(Source: Eye Radio)

(Source: Eye Radio)

GOVERNMENT —

Kiir Appoints Kon John Akot as Petroleum Undersecretary

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Eye Radio



Electricity transmission tower (Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

President Salva Kiir has appointed Kon John Akot as Undersecretary of Petroleum, replacing Santino Ayuel Longar, according to reporting by Eye Radio on 14 November. The change, at the top administrative level of the ministry responsible for South Sudan's most important industry, comes in the same month in which the national oil company is preparing to court investors at the South Sudan Oil and Power conference in Juba and in which Juba has signed a memorandum with Sudan on crude oil volumes. No reason for the replacement was given in the headline reporting available for this edition, and no statement of the new undersecretary's programme was published alongside the appointment news.

The undersecretary's post matters because petroleum is not one sector among many in South Sudan; it is the fiscal foundation of the state. Oil revenue funds the great majority of government spending, pays public salaries when it flows, and determines whether the government can finance services and election preparations. The official who administers the ministry works at the point where production contracts, joint ventures with international operators, the national oil company Nile Petroleum Corporation, and the export route through Sudan all meet. A change in that post therefore interests operators, traders and neighbouring governments as well as domestic political observers.

South Sudan's current production is commonly put by conference organisers and industry reporting at about one hundred and seventy thousand barrels per day, with an official ambition to raise output towards two hundred and thirty thousand barrels per day in the near term and higher in the longer term across fourteen exploration blocks. Those targets depend on investment, security, technical services and, above all, export access. Crude from South Sudan's main fields reaches the sea through pipelines crossing Sudan to Red Sea terminals, which means the war between Sudan's army and the Rapid Support Forces is not a foreign story for Juba's finance ministry; it is a direct risk to every barrel and to the budget built on it.

The timing of the appointment, days before the South Sudan Oil and Power event scheduled for 24 to 25 November in Juba, will invite attention from the companies arriving for that conference. Investors in frontier oil provinces consistently ask the same questions: who decides, how stable are the decision-makers, how are contracts honoured, and how transparent is the handling of revenue. A new undersecretary will be assessed by those audiences on early signals, including continuity in existing joint ventures, clarity about licensing and local content, and whether the ministry presents a single, consistent account of production and export volumes. None of that can be judged from an appointment announcement alone.

Domestically, petroleum appointments are also read through the politics of the transition. South Sudan is being administered by a caretaker government established after President Kiir dissolved the transitional institutions in September, ahead of elections now scheduled for February 2027. Senior appointments made in a caretaker period carry an extra burden of explanation, because the government making them has not yet faced voters. That does not make such appointments unusual or improper in themselves; ministries must be staffed and administered. It does mean that transparency about qualifications, responsibilities and the reasons for change helps public confidence, particularly in a sector where large sums and foreign partners are involved.

The new undersecretary inherits a difficult in-tray beyond the conference. Industry reporting this month has described how South Sudan's exports are affected by the competing demands of Sudan's warring forces along the export route, how prepayment and financing arrangements linked to future cargoes have been the subject of legal dispute in London in recent years, and how production figures reported at the wellhead are hard to reconcile publicly with tanker loadings at the Red Sea. Those are structural problems that no single official created, but the ministry's senior administrator is one of the people expected to manage them, alongside the minister, Nilepet and the finance authorities.

For citizens, the test of petroleum administration is ultimately visible far from the oilfields: in whether teachers, health workers and soldiers are paid on time, whether fuel is available and affordable in Juba and the states, and whether oil income appears in budgets that legislatures and the public can scrutinise. South Sudan's long debate about resource governance, including calls for greater publication of contracts and revenues, forms the background against which any senior petroleum appointment should be reported. This newspaper records the appointment as reported, notes that no policy statement accompanied it in the available reporting, and will follow the new undersecretary's first public engagements, including at the Juba conference, for evidence of direction.

Kon John Akot therefore takes up one of the most consequential administrative posts in the country at a moment when oil, elections and regional war intersect. His predecessor Santino Ayuel Longar leaves the role as the ministry prepares its investment case to the world. Whether the change brings continuity or a shift in approach will become clear in the handling of the conference, the memorandum with Sudan and the production agenda in the weeks ahead. What is already clear is the weight of the desk: in South Sudan, the petroleum undersecretary helps administer the revenue on which the entire transition depends.

(Source: Eye Radio)

(Source: Eye Radio)

OIL AND SUDAN —

South Sudan and Sudan Sign Memorandum on Crude Oil Volumes

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Eye Radio



Electricity transmission tower (Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

South Sudan and Sudan have signed a memorandum of understanding on crude oil volumes, according to reporting by Eye Radio on 14 November, in a development that goes to the heart of both countries' economies despite the war still raging inside Sudan. The memorandum was reported as a headline item alongside other South Sudanese developments that day, without published detail in the available reporting on the exact volumes, duration or implementing arrangements agreed. Even without those details, the fact of a formal understanding between Juba and Sudan on crude volumes is significant, because South Sudan's landlocked oil can reach world markets only through Sudanese pipelines and Red Sea terminals, and Sudan's own finances have long depended in part on transit and processing arrangements for that oil.

The relationship is one of the most consequential legacies of South Sudan's independence in 2011. When the south separated, it took most of the unified country's oil production with it, while the pipelines, refineries and export terminal remained in the north. The two states have therefore needed each other ever since, through periods of cooperation, shutdown, dispute and renegotiation. A memorandum on volumes speaks to the practical core of that interdependence: how much crude will flow, on what understanding, and with what expectations on both sides. In normal times such an agreement would be technical news; in wartime it is strategic news, because the infrastructure it concerns crosses active conflict zones.

Sudan's war, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces since April 2023, has repeatedly threatened that infrastructure and the revenues attached to it. Industry reporting this month described a fragmented export corridor in which different forces control different points along the route from the oilfields to the sea, and in which payments and security arrangements have had to be negotiated in conditions of duress. South Sudanese troops have been reported to protect installations at Heglig under a tripartite arrangement, while the surrounding territory and the terminals lie under different authorities. A memorandum signed with Sudan in this environment should be read as an attempt to keep a formal framework in place while the ground reality remains contested.

For Juba, the stakes are fiscal and immediate. Oil exports fund the state, and interruptions or uncertainty about volumes translate quickly into salary delays, currency pressure and difficulty financing public commitments, including the elections now scheduled for February 2027. Predictability about crude volumes helps the finance ministry plan, helps traders schedule cargoes, and helps operators decide whether to invest in raising production from about one hundred and seventy thousand barrels per day towards official targets above two hundred thousand. For Sudan's authorities, transit income and a working relationship with Juba over the pipeline are among the few economic assets that retain value amid a war that has destroyed much else.

Readers should be careful about what a memorandum of understanding is and is not. An MoU typically records intentions and a framework for cooperation; it is not, by itself, proof that volumes have changed, that payments have been made, or that every authority controlling territory along the pipeline has accepted its terms. The reporting available for this edition did not publish the text, the signatories' names, the venue or the volume figures, and this newspaper does not supply them from speculation. The verified fact is the signing itself, as reported by Eye Radio, and its context. Further reporting that publishes the document or official statements from both governments would allow a fuller assessment of what has actually been agreed.

The memorandum also arrives in a crowded oil diplomacy month for South Sudan. The national oil company Nilepet has been confirmed as a diamond sponsor of the South Sudan Oil and Power conference in Juba on 24 to 25 November, where the government will seek new investment and technical partnerships, and President Kiir has just changed the undersecretary at the petroleum ministry. Together, those developments describe a government trying to present continuity and momentum in its oil sector while its export route runs through a war. International investors attending the conference will weigh the memorandum as one signal among several, alongside security, contract stability and the

transparency of revenue handling.

There is a human dimension that technical language about volumes can obscure. When crude does not flow, the effects appear in South Sudanese markets as fuel shortages and price rises, in ministries as unpaid salaries, and in households as school fees and medicines that cannot be bought. When it does flow, the question becomes whether the income is managed for public benefit. A volumes memorandum therefore deserves public scrutiny of a kind that goes beyond the signing ceremony: publication of its main terms, regular reporting of actual exports, and clarity about how transit costs and any payments to authorities along the route are accounted for.

For now, Juba and Khartoum's rival realities have produced at least a document. In a region where the pipeline has survived independence, shutdowns and now a civil war in the transit country, keeping the two governments in formal discussion about crude is preferable to silence or rupture. The memorandum's value will be measured in tankers loaded, revenues received and terms disclosed in the months ahead, not in the announcement itself.

(Source: Eye Radio)

(Source: Eye Radio)

ENERGY —

Nilepet Confirmed as Diamond Sponsor as Juba Prepares Oil and Power Conference

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Energy Capital & Power



Electricity transmission tower (Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

South Sudan's national oil company, the Nile Petroleum Corporation, known as Nilepet, and its subsidiaries have been confirmed as diamond sponsors of South Sudan Oil and Power 2026, the energy conference to be held in Juba on 24 and 25 November, according to a release from Energy Capital and Power distributed on 14 November. The organisers said Nilepet and its subsidiaries would use the event to strengthen existing joint ventures and attract new partners across the energy value chain. The confirmation places the state oil company at the centre of the government's pitch to investors at a moment when South Sudan is seeking to raise production, open new exploration acreage and reassure partners about a sector whose exports cross war-torn Sudan.

South Sudan Oil and Power is the country's flagship energy investment event, bringing together the petroleum ministry, the national oil company, international operators, service companies, financiers and legal and technical advisers. Organisers and industry reporting put current production at about one hundred and seventy to one hundred and seventy-four thousand barrels per day, with a near-term ambition of about two hundred and thirty thousand barrels per day, a longer-term target higher still, and fourteen exploration blocks available. The conference programme is expected to include technical workshops, panel discussions and project showcases intended to turn geological potential and service needs into contracts across upstream production, midstream transport and downstream supply.

Nilepet's role is pivotal to how that pitch is received. As the national oil company, it is the state's commercial face in joint ventures, the holder of state interests in producing fields and a vehicle for building domestic capacity in a sector historically dominated by foreign operators and technical staff. Its subsidiaries span parts of the value chain that citizens encounter directly, including fuel supply. When Nilepet sponsors the national conference at the highest tier, it signals that the state company intends to be a convener of the investment conversation, not only a recipient of it. Investors will look past sponsorship, however, to questions of governance, payment record, technical capability and clarity about the company's mandate and accounts.

The conference comes at a delicate moment in the political transition. South Sudan is under a caretaker administration ahead of elections now scheduled for February 2027, the petroleum ministry has a new undersecretary, and the government has signed a memorandum with Sudan on crude volumes. An investment conference held by a caretaker government asks companies to make decisions whose horizons extend well beyond the election. That can be done, and resource projects routinely outlast governments, but it raises the premium on legal stability and on demonstrating that commitments made in Juba in November will be honoured by whichever government emerges from the February vote. Organisers will be aware that political risk is the first item on most investors' checklists for South Sudan.

The export problem will also be in the room, whether or not it is on the agenda. South Sudan's crude reaches the sea through Sudan, where war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces has fragmented control of the pipeline corridor and

the Red Sea terminals. Industry analysis published this month argued that fresh capital can finance production inside South Sudan but cannot by itself secure passage through Sudan, and described how both Sudanese forces extract value from the transit trade. Conference delegates considering new exploration blocks, including frontier acreage such as Block B2 in Greater Jonglei where South African state-linked interests have been preparing exploration, must price that transit risk into every projection they make.

There are also opportunities that do not depend on the pipeline alone. Organisers have highlighted local supplier development, workforce training, technical studies, refining and storage, and partnerships of the kind described in a recent memorandum between the petroleum ministry and a United Arab Emirates-based company covering exploration, midstream storage, refining, studies and capacity building. For South Sudanese professionals and businesses, the most tangible promise of a conference like this is not a headline production target but contracts for local firms, training for engineers and geoscientists, and a supplier base that keeps more of each oil dollar in the country. Those outcomes should be reported after the event with the same prominence as the sponsorship announcements before it.

Energy access gives the conference a second audience beyond investors. Most South Sudanese households have no reliable electricity, and fuel costs shape transport, food prices and the running of hospitals and schools. A national oil company and a petroleum ministry are judged by citizens not only on barrels exported but on whether resource wealth visibly improves daily life. Discussions at the conference about downstream supply, storage and power should therefore be followed by the public and the press, and any commitments on local content or community investment should be recorded precisely so they can be checked later. Sponsorship tiers and production targets are easy to announce; verifiable benefits are harder and more important.

When delegates gather in Juba on 24 November, Nilepet will be both host and exhibit: the company presenting South Sudan's energy future is itself one of the institutions investors are evaluating. A successful conference, in substance rather than ceremony, would produce named partnerships, timelines and financing for specific projects, and a clear account of how production growth will be reconciled with the transit realities in Sudan.

(Source: Energy Capital & Power)

(Source: Energy Capital & Power)

HEALTH —

Six Embassies Warn of Ebola Risk as Kenya Begins 42 Days of Monitoring

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: 254 News



Displaced families in South Sudan (Photo: USAID, public domain)

Six foreign embassies have warned about the risk of Ebola reaching South Sudan, in a joint statement issued on Thursday, 12 November and reported on 13 November, urging South Sudan to fund health services as a Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak continues in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. The embassies of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States issued the warning as Kenya began a forty-two-day monitoring period after recording nine Ebola cases including two deaths. Although South Sudan has not recorded a Bundibugyo Ebola case, the World Health Organization was reported to put its risk of importation at ninety-nine per cent, a figure that underlines how exposed the country is judged to be.

The geography explains the concern. South Sudan shares a border of approximately eight hundred and thirteen kilometres with the Democratic Republic of Congo, directly alongside areas experiencing an active outbreak, and confirmed cases in Congo had exceeded ten thousand nine hundred as of 9 November according to the reporting. Borders in this region are crossed daily by traders, families and transport workers, and surveillance at formal crossing points cannot capture every movement along a frontier of that length. South Sudan is also an important export market for Kenya, with roughly eight hundred to fifteen hundred people crossing between the two countries daily, which is why developments in Kenyan monitoring are relevant to Juba as well as to Nairobi.

South Sudanese authorities have already investigated several suspected cases. The reporting described a fatal haemorrhagic fever case in Morobo County that was

investigated, with two blood samples testing negative for Ebola before tests confirmed yellow fever on 10 November, and a separate alert in Yei that was awaiting laboratory confirmation in early November. Those episodes show both sides of the present situation: the surveillance system is detecting and testing alerts, which is what it is supposed to do, and the country is generating suspected cases that must each be resolved by laboratories while an actual outbreak continues across the border. Every alert consumes staff, transport, protective equipment and laboratory capacity that are in short supply.

Kenya's monitoring period gives the region a shared clock. Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale said the forty-two days cover twice the virus's longest incubation period, and that if Kenya records no new case it will qualify for Ebola-free status on 23 December. That timeline matters for South Sudan because travel and trade measures are already in force: the reporting noted Ebola-related travel restrictions involving destinations including the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Restrictions of that kind affect South Sudanese travellers, students, patients seeking treatment abroad and traders, and they tend to tighten quickly if a case is confirmed and loosen slowly even when alerts test negative.

The embassies' central request, as reported, was about money for health services. That is the practical heart of preparedness: surveillance officers paid and fuelled, isolation facilities identified before they are needed, protective equipment in place at border counties and referral hospitals, laboratories able to move samples quickly, and risk communication in local languages that tells people what symptoms to report and where to go. South Sudan's health system, heavily supported by international partners and non-governmental organisations, has been strained by funding cuts described in other recent reporting on displacement camps, where a single provider now covers water, sanitation and primary care for more than a hundred thousand people in one location.

Ebola preparedness also competes with emergencies already under way. South Sudan has recorded nearly one hundred and ten thousand cholera cases and almost two thousand deaths nationwide since 2024 according to Doctors Without Borders reporting this month, with more than fourteen thousand cases in the first nine months of this year alone. Health workers in border counties are therefore not preparing for a hypothetical threat in otherwise quiet clinics; they are managing cholera, malaria, malnutrition and the ordinary burden of illness while adding Ebola surveillance on top. International support that arrives as a separate vertical programme, without strengthening those same clinics and staff, is less useful than support that does both.

For the public, the essential facts should be kept clear and calm. No Bundibugyo Ebola case has been recorded in South Sudan in the reporting available for this edition. Suspected cases have been investigated and at least one was confirmed as yellow fever, a different and also serious disease. The risk assessment is high because of proximity and movement, not because transmission inside South Sudan has been established. People in border areas should follow health authorities' guidance, report severe illness with bleeding symptoms promptly, and avoid rumours that name individuals or communities. Newspapers have a duty in such moments to report alerts accurately without presenting suspicion as confirmation.

The coming weeks will test whether the warning produces funding and preparation rather than only concern. The six embassies have put their names to a public statement, which creates an expectation that their governments will also support the response they are urging South Sudan to fund. Kenya's forty-two-day clock runs to 23 December, Congo's outbreak continues, and South Sudan's surveillance will keep generating alerts that need fast, well-resourced answers. Preparedness is cheapest before the first confirmed case and hardest to build afterwards. That is the window the embassies' statement, and this reporting, are about.

(Source: 254 News)

(Source: 254 News)

JUSTICE —

Machar Raises Fresh Security Concern as Special Court Adjourns to 18 November

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: The Dawn



UN Security Council chamber (Photo: CTBTO, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Former First Vice President Riek Machar has raised a fresh security concern before the Special Court trying him and seven co-defendants in Juba, asking the judges to consider an urgent complaint involving his defence team, according to reports of the court's one hundred and twenty-eighth session

at Freedom Hall. Presiding Judge Stephen Simon Binjigwa responded that the court was competent to hear urgent matters but that the complaint should be formally presented by Machar's defence lawyers. The court then adjourned proceedings until Wednesday, 18 November, to allow for the state burial of veteran politician and military commander General Joseph Lagu Yanga, who was scheduled to be buried in Juba on Friday and whose farewell was led by President Salva Kiir.

The exchange, reported by The Dawn on 12 November and by the Radio Community network on 11 November, was brief in form but significant in context. Security concerns raised by a defendant about his own lawyers go to the fairness of a trial, because a defence team that cannot meet, travel or communicate safely cannot prepare a case. The judge's response, insisting on formal presentation by the lawyers themselves, placed the matter inside ordinary procedure rather than treating it as an exception. What the complaint actually contains has not been published in the available reporting, and this newspaper does not speculate about its contents. The next procedural step is for the defence to present it formally and for the court to rule on it on the record.

Machar and his seven co-defendants face charges including murder, conspiracy, terrorism, treason, destruction of public property and crimes against humanity, all of which they deny. Prosecutors allege that forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition, allied with the White Army, attacked a government garrison in Nasir, Upper Nile State, in March 2025, killing two hundred and fifty-seven soldiers including General David Majur Dak and destroying or seizing military equipment valued at approximately fifty-eight million dollars. Machar remains under house arrest, while the other accused are held at National Security Service detention facilities in Juba, according to the reporting of the trial.

The trial has now run to well over one hundred sessions, and its recent history includes other defence complaints about conditions. In early November, lead defence lawyer Dr Geri Raimondo Legge told the court that family visits to the accused had been suspended in October after concerns were raised about alleged poisoning, and described a search conducted at night on 1 November at the detention facility as unusual after nearly a year without a similar search. The presiding judge on that occasion directed the defence to submit its concerns in writing so the other party could respond before a ruling. In his defence evidence, Machar has told the court that he and colleagues worked with communities, traditional leaders and officials to prevent violence and restore peace in Nasir, a position the prosecution contests.

Why this trial matters beyond the courtroom is difficult to overstate. Machar is not only a defendant; he is a principal signatory of the 2018 revitalised peace agreement and the leader of the SPLM-IO, whose participation is central to whether South Sudan's transition and its newly scheduled February 2027 elections are inclusive. United Nations briefers told the Security Council on 10 November that his detention complicates political dialogue and electoral participation. Supporters of the trial argue that accountability for the Nasir killings cannot be set aside for political convenience. Critics argue that prosecuting the main opposition leader during an election transition undermines the peace agreement. Both arguments are now being tested, session by session, in a public court.

Procedure is therefore not a technicality in this case; it is the substance on which the trial's legitimacy will be judged. Formal complaints presented in writing, responses from the prosecution, reasoned rulings from the three-judge panel and a public record of each step are the mechanisms by which a politically charged trial demonstrates that it is a legal process rather than a political outcome with legal form. The handling of the latest security concern, from its formal presentation to the court's ruling, will be watched for exactly that reason by domestic observers, by the parties to the peace agreement and by international partners who have repeatedly called for fairness and transparency in the proceedings.

The adjournment to 18 November, taken for Lagu's state burial, also places the trial inside the nation's wider calendar. In the same week, the elections commission postponed polling to February, the president led a liberation hero's farewell, and the court trying his former deputy paused for that farewell before resuming. South Sudan's institutions are attempting to conduct mourning, an election transition and the most sensitive trial in the country's history simultaneously, with limited resources and deep political divisions. How each institution handles its part, carefully and on the record, will shape confidence in all of them.

When the court reconvenes on 18 November, the defence is expected to continue and the security complaint is expected to be presented in the form the judge required. No outcome on that complaint should be assumed in advance.

(Source: The Dawn)

(Source: The Dawn)

SUDAN & THE REGION

SUDAN WAR —

Army Gains in West Kordofan at Al-Khuwai Could Shift Fight Against RSF, Analysts Say

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Al Jazeera



Humanitarian aid delivery in Sudan (Photo: FCDO, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

The Sudanese Armed Forces and allied forces have gained control of several strategically important villages and localities in West Kordofan this week, including the town of Al-Khuwai on Friday, in an offensive that analysts say could shift the balance of the war against the Rapid Support Forces, according to Al Jazeera reporting published on 14 November. The campaign in the resource-rich state, under way for several weeks, has broken the RSF siege on Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, and opened new routes for the army in central and south-western Sudan, paving the way for advances in South Kordofan towards Babnusa and the approaches to North Darfur, including a road linking Al-Nuhud, a gold-mining area, with Al-Khuwai.

Independent confirmation of control on the ground remains limited, and readers should hold the map loosely. Separate reporting of the same advance noted that army-allied forces said they entered Al-Khuwai after taking Sarif Ankoush on the road towards En Nahud, that Sudan Tribune reported the advance through military sources, and that RSF-aligned channels claimed a counter-ambush, with at least one newspaper saying it could not independently verify either the ambush claim or battlefield losses. In Sudan's war, towns have changed hands and claims have repeatedly run ahead of verifiable fact. What multiple accounts agree on is that a material army-allied push into Al-Khuwai took place on 13 November and that Kordofan is now the war's central front.

The strategic logic is about roads and supply. Kordofan sits between Khartoum, Darfur and South Sudan, and whoever holds its towns and highways can move forces and supplies between the capital region and the west. The RSF still holds Al-Nuhud and parts of South Kordofan together with its alleged allies in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and it still controls all five states of Darfur, including El Fasher, the North Darfur capital, which fell to the RSF in October 2025 after a long siege and bloody reprisals in which thousands of civilians were killed, tortured, detained or raped according to reporting of that fall. An army advance in Kordofan does not reverse Darfur, but it threatens the corridor connecting Darfur to the rest of Sudan.

Analysts quoted in the reporting argued that a shift from attack to defence changes the RSF's position in ways that go beyond territory. Independent Sudanese analyst Mohamed Ali told Al Jazeera that the RSF's shift to defence will alter its military composition, which was built on demanding rapid tribal support, and the reporting noted that Kordofan is not a social stronghold for the RSF, leading to expectations that it may withdraw from parts of the region and reposition forces in Darfur. Mobilisation-based forces are strongest when advancing and recruiting on momentum; holding ground against a conventional army with air power and allied Darfur movements fighting alongside it is a different and harder task.

The humanitarian cost of the Kordofan fighting is already immense and will grow with the offensive. The United Nations has identified Kordofan as the epicentre of Sudan's conflict and said fighting there is complicating an already dire humanitarian situation. The International Organization for Migration recorded an estimated three hundred and ten thousand nine hundred and fifty-six people displaced from the wider Kordofan region between October 2025 and September 2026, and El Obeid hosts large numbers of displaced people even as it faces drone fire and shelling. Across Sudan, the war has killed about one hundred and fifty thousand people and displaced more than fourteen million of a population of fifty-three million, making it one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

For South Sudan, Kordofan is not a distant front. West Kordofan borders the oil-producing areas and the pipeline corridor on which South Sudanese exports depend, Heglig's fields lie in this contested geography, and fighting around Al-Nuhud and Al-Khuwai takes place in the same region through which crude, goods and displaced people move between the two countries. Juba has just signed a memorandum with Sudan on crude volumes, and the durability of any such understanding depends in part on who controls the ground in Kordofan. South Sudanese communities along the border also receive Sudanese families fleeing the fighting, adding to displacement pressures on both sides of a frontier drawn through connected communities.

Military momentum should not be confused with a path to peace. Sudan's war began in April 2023 as a power struggle between the army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, and repeated external mediation efforts have failed to produce a durable ceasefire. An army advance in Kordofan may improve Khartoum's negotiating position, or it may persuade the RSF to dig into Darfur and harden a de facto partition of the country, a prospect diplomats have warned about since El Fasher fell. Neither outcome ends the war for civilians in El Obeid, Babnusa or the villages along the Al-Nuhud road, where the immediate questions are safety, food and whether aid can reach them at all.

The coming weeks will show whether Al-Khuwai is held, whether the army can move on Babnusa and towards North Darfur, and whether the RSF repositions as analysts expect or counter-attacks as its channels claim. Each of those possibilities should be verified against independent reporting rather than belligerents' statements.

(Source: Al Jazeera)

(Source: Al Jazeera)

SUDAN WAR —

Sudan Army Says It Shot Down Drone from Ethiopia as Kurmuk Death Toll Rises to 16

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Sudan Tribune



Humanitarian aid delivery in Sudan (Photo: FCDO, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Sudan's army says its air defences shot down a long-range drone it described as hostile in the Dandaro area of Blue Nile region on Friday, alleging the aircraft had crossed into Sudan from Ethiopia, while the death toll from a separate drone strike on displaced civilians in Kurmuk County rose to sixteen, according to Sudan Tribune reporting summarised in Addis Standard's daily brief on 14 November. The military identified the drone as hostile but provided no further details about its origin or intended target in the report. Separately, local authorities transported wounded civilians to Ed Damazin after a Rapid Support Forces drone strike targeted displaced people in Bani Shako town in Kurmuk County, where Governor Abdel-Ati al-Faki visited the wounded and said six displaced people were injured and several others were still missing besides those killed.

The allegation about Ethiopia is serious and must be reported precisely as an allegation. Sudan has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of providing launch sites for drones used in attacks on military installations and civilian infrastructure inside Sudan, and Khartoum has also accused its eastern neighbour of providing logistical support to the RSF and to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, both fighting government forces in the south-eastern Blue Nile region. Ethiopia has denied allegations of involvement in Sudan's conflict. No independent verification of the Dandaro drone's origin was published in the reporting available for this edition, and a drone crossing a border, even if established, would not by itself establish which government, if any, launched or directed it in a war where drones are widely used and widely traded.

Blue Nile has become one of the war's expanding fronts this year. United Nations humanitarian briefings this month noted that the war had spread to a new frontline in the Blue Nile states, with nearly one hundred and twenty thousand people displaced there since January. Kurmuk County, near the Ethiopian border, sits in that contested geography, where the SPLM-N faction led by Malik Agar is aligned with the government in Khartoum while other armed movements and the RSF contest territory. A strike on displaced people in Bani Shako, if attributed as local authorities attribute it, is an attack on exactly the population that humanitarian law most clearly protects: civilians who have already fled their homes and gathered in a place of refuge.

The rising Kurmuk toll, from initial reports to sixteen confirmed by the governor after visiting the wounded in Ed Damazin, illustrates how casualty figures in this war develop. First reports from remote counties are almost always incomplete, communications are poor, the missing may be found alive or dead, and the wounded may not survive their injuries. Responsible reporting therefore records the figure as given by the named official at the time, sixteen dead and six injured with several missing, and updates it when authorities or medical sources revise it, rather than treating any early number as final. Behind the figures are displaced families in a border county who had already lost their homes before the strike reached them.

Drones have transformed Sudan's war in ways that reporting from across the country now documents weekly. United Nations Children's Fund briefings this month described long-range drones travelling up to fifteen hundred kilometres to strike power stations, with up to fifteen power installations hit in October and attacks recorded on almost every day of

that month's final week, cutting water pumping, treatment, healthcare and irrigation. Two in three child casualties in Sudan this year were caused by armed drones according to UNICEF. The Dandaro and Kurmuk reports belong to that pattern: relatively inexpensive, long-range weapons bringing a front line that once depended on distance into towns, displacement sites and infrastructure far from ground fighting.

The Ethiopia dimension carries regional risks beyond the immediate incidents. Sudan and Ethiopia are neighbours with a long, sensitive border, disputed territory at Al-Fashaga, shared interests in the Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and a history of relations that have moved between cooperation and hostility. Public accusations by Khartoum that drones are launched from Ethiopian territory, and Ethiopian denials, create a diplomatic confrontation running alongside the civil war. For South Sudan, which borders both countries and hosts refugees from Sudan while managing its own fragile transition, any escalation between Khartoum and Addis Ababa would add a second regional crisis to the one already spilling across its northern border.

Humanitarian access in Blue Nile will suffer whatever the truth of the drone's origin. Aid agencies plan movements around perceived air risk as well as ground fighting, and a county where displaced people have just been killed from the air is a county where distributions, medical evacuations and assessments become harder to organise and more dangerous to staff. The wounded taken to Ed Damazin, the state capital, reached care because a road journey was still possible; in many parts of Sudan's war zones even that is no longer true.

Two facts are established by the 14 November reporting and should not be blurred together: Sudan's army says it downed a hostile long-range drone at Dandaro that it alleges crossed from Ethiopia, an allegation Ethiopia's established position denies in general terms and which remains unverified independently; and sixteen displaced civilians are reported by Kurmuk's governor to have died in a drone strike at Bani Shako attributed to the RSF, with six injured and several missing.

(Source: Sudan Tribune)

(Source: Sudan Tribune)

CHILDREN IN WAR —

Drones and Drought Close In on Sudan's Children, UNICEF Warns

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: UN News



Refugee assistance (Photo: UNHCR, CC BY 2.0, via Openverse)

Drones and drought are closing in on Sudan's children from both sides, the United Nations Children's Fund warned in a briefing in Geneva on 10 November that continued to lead regional coverage through this week, describing attacks on power stations and a failing harvest that together threaten children's safety, water, education and food. UNICEF spokesperson James Elder, speaking straight after returning from El Obeid in North Kordofan, said that in the last week of October not a single day passed without an armed drone striking a power station in Sudan, that up to fifteen power stations were hit in October, and that this year two in three child casualties in Sudan were caused by armed drones, which are bringing war to places that were once safe.

The mechanism Elder described is a chain that starts with electricity and ends with hunger and disease. When a power station is struck, water pumps and water treatment stop, families are forced onto expensive and unsafe alternatives, fuel for irrigation becomes unaffordable, healthcare facilities lose power, and incomes collapse because people cannot move, work or trade normally. At the same time, damage from El Niño-linked drought has already begun, and even if late rains arrived they would not undo it, because the planting window for the 2026 to 2027 cereal harvest has closed. Sudan therefore faces a war on its infrastructure and a failed season in its fields simultaneously, with children at the end of both chains.

The numbers UNICEF attached to that warning are stark. An estimated eight hundred and twenty-five thousand children under five in Sudan are expected to suffer severe acute malnutrition in 2026, the form of malnutrition that kills. UNICEF and partners have treated hundreds of thousands of children for that condition, helped provide healthcare to more than two and a half million people and vaccinated millions of

children against deadly diseases, yet the agency's response in Sudan is only one third funded. Across the country, United Nations estimates put about thirty-three point seven million people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2026, and the wider shelter response described by the refugee and migration agencies this month can reach only about one in ten of those who need emergency shelter.

Elder grounded the statistics in individual children he had met in El Obeid, and one account has been widely reported from the briefing. A teenager named Buri lost both his hands in an explosion and now lives in a tent in a displacement camp. He spends his mornings learning online and his afternoons picking grass for animals with stumps for hands, helped by his friends. Elder also described damage to education on a scale that will outlast the fighting: a drone strike on a UNICEF warehouse in El Obeid on 20 September destroyed more than two hundred and ninety-two thousand school textbooks, forty thousand Arabic language and mathematics revision books and other learning materials intended for distribution to children at the start of the academic year.

El Obeid's experience captures why Kordofan has become the war's epicentre. The city has survived a siege that army advances this week are reported to have broken, hosts around one hundred thousand displaced people who arrived after long marches from surrounding villages, and remains under regular drone fire and shelling. Displacement camps there provide child-friendly spaces and primary healthcare supported by UNICEF, where children are screened for malnutrition and mothers wait for services. Investigators for the United Nations Human Rights Council say civilians in the area live in constant fear of drone attack. A city can be simultaneously a refuge, a front line and a target, and for children growing up in its camps all three descriptions are true at once.

UNICEF's asks at the briefing were specific and were directed at parties and their backers, not only at donors. The agency called for an end to violence against children and to attacks on power stations, water systems and civilian infrastructure, for those with influence to stop the flow of weapons killing and injuring children, and for sustained funding to keep safe water, malnutrition treatment, healthcare, education and protection running. Those asks reflect the agency's judgement that funding alone cannot solve a crisis whose drivers include deliberate attacks on the systems children depend on. A funded water programme cannot operate a treatment plant without electricity, and a funded school programme cannot replace textbooks faster than warehouses are destroyed.

For South Sudanese readers, Sudan's child crisis is also a domestic story in the making. Sudanese families continue to cross into South Sudan seeking safety, and returnee and refugee sites in Upper Nile and Unity states host children whose health and education needs arrive with them, in a South Sudanese system itself strained by cholera, flooding and funding cuts. The drought and harvest failure UNICEF describes do not respect the border either, because northern South Sudan shares climate, markets and food supply routes with Kordofan and Darfur. What happens to Sudan's children this season will shape arrivals, food prices and disease risks in South Sudan in the months that follow.

The warning from Geneva will compete for attention with the week's political news, and it should not lose. Elections, conferences and battlefield advances will decide Sudan's and South Sudan's futures over years, but malnutrition decides a child's future in weeks, and a drone strike decides it in seconds.

(Source: UN News)

(Source: UN News)

AFRICA

ELECTIONS • SOMALIA —

Somalia Election Talks Fail to Open as Opposition Boycotts Villa Somalia Meeting

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Abay Times



Mogadishu, Somalia from orbit (Photo: NASA, public domain, Wikimedia Commons)

Talks on Somalia's disputed elections, called by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, failed to open as scheduled on Saturday, 14 November, after the country's main opposition alliance boycotted the gathering at Villa Somalia, the seat of the presidency in Mogadishu. The meeting had been planned as a five-day dialogue on the contested electoral framework, constitutional amendments and the path to one-person, one-vote elections. Hours after the boycott became clear, the presidency said contacts with the invited parties were continuing and that the meeting would still be convened, but it gave no revised date, confirmed venue or list of

participants.

The boycotting alliance, the Somali Future Council, is the broadest opposition grouping in the country. Its members include former president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former prime ministers, and the leaderships of Puntland and Jubaland, two federal member states whose relationship with Mogadishu has been strained for months. Puntland and Jubaland had already rejected the invitation outright. The council told the international Quartet of the United States, Britain, the European Union and Türkiye that it would not attend a meeting held on Villa Somalia's terms, a formulation that points to a dispute not only about the agenda, but about who sets it and under what guarantees.

The standoff follows a Supreme Court ruling earlier in November that has reshaped the legal ground beneath the talks. The court found that the four-year mandates of the president and the federal parliament had expired, on 15 May and 14 April respectively. It also found that later constitutional amendments extending terms to five years did not automatically bind sitting institutions. The court directed political actors to agree a workable electoral framework by a deadline falling in early December, and to hold elections within 90 days. That timetable now hangs over every negotiation, whether the parties acknowledge it or not.

The government has contested the practical force of the judgment. It continues to defend the electoral commission's timetable of parliamentary elections on 15 April 2027 and a presidential vote on 15 May, under the one-person, one-vote model that Villa Somalia favours. Invitations to this week's talks went out on 26 October to four groupings, and the presidency's statement on 14 November said communications with the invited parties remained active and final preparations for the consultative platform were under way. Between the court's early-December deadline and the government's April and May dates lies the central unanswered question: which calendar, and which rules, will Somalia actually vote under?

Somalia's electoral argument is about more than dates. For years the country chose its leaders through an indirect system in which clan elders and delegates selected parliamentarians, who in turn elected the president. Villa Somalia's push for direct, one-person, one-vote elections is presented as a democratic advance, and in principle it is widely welcomed. The opposition's objection is to process: whether constitutional amendments were introduced lawfully, whether the electoral commission is seen as neutral, and whether security and registration make a direct vote genuinely possible across the whole country at the same time.

Regional politics deepen the difficulty. Puntland and Jubaland have opposed aspects of the amendment process and the proposed arrangements, and their absence from a national dialogue is not a minor procedural gap. Elections in Somalia require the federal member states, because registration, security and polling must happen on their territory and with their cooperation. A framework agreed in Mogadishu without them would struggle to be implemented, just as a framework imposed by the court without political buy-in would struggle to be enforced. That is why the Quartet's willingness to facilitate, reported earlier in the week, may yet matter if the talks are reconvened on terms all sides can accept.

For ordinary Somalis, the cost of deadlock is measured in uncertainty: public services planned around contested mandates, businesses unsure which authority will regulate them, and citizens unsure when, or how, they will first cast a direct vote. The presidency says the meeting will still happen. The opposition says it will not attend on the current terms. The space between those two statements, and the early-December deadline, now defines Somali politics. A credible path forward will need a venue, an agenda and guarantees that every major party can defend in public. (Source: Abay Times)

For South Sudanese readers, the wider lesson is familiar and practical. Institutions earn trust not through announcements alone, but through dates that are kept, rules that are applied evenly, and services that reach ordinary families. When leaders explain difficult decisions openly, publish clear timetables, and invite scrutiny from citizens, churches, parties and the press, confidence grows even where disagreement remains strong. When those habits slip, rumours fill the gap and every delay or dispute is read in the worst possible light.

What happens next will therefore matter as much as what has already been said. Follow-through, in the form of published documents, funded plans, named officials responsible for delivery, and regular public updates, is the test by which voters will judge the promises now being made. Opposition parties, civil society groups and journalists will be watching for that evidence, and so will regional partners whose support depends on stability, predictability and respect for agreed rules.

(Source: Abay Times)

AFRICAN UNION • ACCRA —

African Union Meets in Accra to Confront Financing Dependence and Peace Fund Reform

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: TownCrier Africa



Accra, Ghana (Photo: Synth85, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

The African Union convened an extraordinary meeting of its Executive Council in Accra on Friday, 13 November, to examine how the continental organisation can strengthen its financial independence and fund its priorities more sustainably. The 27th Extraordinary Session, hosted by Ghana in collaboration with the African Union Commission, was held at the Labadi Beach Hotel under the theme of a financially sustainable and self-reliant African Union, advancing African ownership, accountability and institutional effectiveness. Ministers of foreign affairs and finance from across the continent took part in a gathering dedicated to a question the Union has debated for years: who pays for Africa's continental institutions?

According to the African Union's official material, the session followed decisions adopted at AU summits in February 2025 and February 2026 calling for an extraordinary Executive Council session on financing. The Commission's 9 November statement identified financial sustainability, institutional effectiveness and strategic autonomy as central objectives. The agenda included institutional rationalisation, more effective programmes, and a unified programme-based budget architecture supported by a medium-term expenditure framework. In plain terms, ministers were asked not only to find more money, but to show that the money is planned, spent and accounted for in a way member states can trust.

The Peace Fund sits at the heart of the debate. The Union's ability to respond to conflicts, support mediation, and back peace operations depends on predictable funding, and dependence on external partners for that funding has long been criticised as a limit on African ownership of African security. When a peace initiative must wait for a donor's budget cycle, or when programmes are shaped by the priorities of those who fund them rather than those who mandated them, the Union's claim to set its own agenda is weakened. Reform of the Peace Fund is therefore not an accounting detail; it is a question of political authority.

Ghana's role as host also carried symbolic weight. The session was organised under the patronage of President John Dramani Mahama, whose government has been presenting Ghana as an active voice in continental affairs ahead of Ghana's forthcoming role in African Union leadership in 2027. Kenya's President William Samoei Ruto, the African Union Champion for Institutional Reform, was among the leaders associated with the reform agenda that the Accra session was meant to advance. Bringing foreign and finance ministers together in the same room was itself a statement: financing the Union cannot be left to diplomats alone, because the decisions must be paid for by treasuries.

The financing problem is well documented in the Union's own reform discussions. Member-state contributions have historically fallen short of agreed targets, arrears have accumulated, and a large share of the programme budget has been covered by international partners. Previous reform efforts introduced levies and new contribution formulas, with mixed results. Ministers in Accra were therefore confronting a credibility test as much as a cash test. If member states want a Union that can act quickly in a crisis, mediate without fear of a funder's veto, and plan programmes over several years rather than one grant at a time, they must fund that ambition themselves, and on time.

Accountability was the other half of the theme, and it matters to citizens as well as ministers. A self-reliant Union that cannot show how its money was used would not command public confidence. The emphasis on institutional effectiveness, programme-based budgeting and a medium-term expenditure framework points towards clearer links between what the Union promises, what it budgets, and what it delivers. Civil society groups across the continent have long asked for exactly that transparency, arguing that African ownership should mean ownership by African publics, not only by governments.

As of the reports from Accra, the cited AU material set out the meeting's agenda rather than a final negotiated outcome, and no comprehensive communiqué with figures was contained in the reporting reviewed for this article. That distinction matters. A meeting that agrees the problem, and even the direction of reform, is a beginning; it is not yet a funded Peace Fund or a paid-up membership. The follow-up, in published decisions, contribution schedules and audited results, will show whether Accra was a turning point or another well-worded session in a long reform story. (Source: TownCrier Africa)

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leaders explain difficult decisions openly, publish clear timetables, and invite scrutiny from citizens, churches, parties and the press, confidence grows even where disagreement remains strong. When those habits slip, rumours fill the gap and every delay or dispute is read in the worst possible light.

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(Source: TownCrier Africa)

SOUTH AFRICA • ANC —

Resignation Calls Mount Against Ramaphosa and ANC Top Seven After Election Setback

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Weekend Argus



South African President Cyril Ramaphosa (Photo: The White House, public domain, Wikimedia Commons)

Calls for President Cyril Ramaphosa and the African National Congress's top seven officials to step down intensified this week after the party's dismal performance in South Africa's 2026 local government elections. The ANC recorded its worst performance in those elections, dropping to just over 30 per cent of the national municipal vote, a result that has forced a public argument about accountability at the very top of the liberation movement that has governed South Africa since 1994. Senior party figures have echoed former President Thabo Mbeki's position that leaders should consider stepping down after such a setback.

The figures explain the pressure. The ANC's national vote share fell from 45.59 per cent in 2021 to 30.76 per cent in 2026, while the party remained the largest single party nationally. It suffered steep losses across provinces, major metropolitan areas and local councils. The result left an unprecedented number of municipalities without an outright majority, forcing negotiations in council after council. For a party that lost its parliamentary majority for the first time in the 2024 general election, the local result confirmed a trend rather than a single bad night, and trends demand a response from those in charge.

Mbeki made his argument publicly, including on the African Renaissance Podcast, saying that political leaders in democratic societies must take accountability after major electoral setbacks. He was responding to media reports claiming Ramaphosa had offered to resign after the results. That framing matters, because it turns the debate from personalities into a democratic principle: if voters deliver a clear rebuke, do leaders own it personally, or do they treat it as a collective difficulty to be managed by the same team that presided over the decline? The ANC Youth League, for its part, defended Ramaphosa while criticising the party's campaigners, a split that shows how unevenly the blame is being shared inside the movement.

The party's formal response so far has been to review, not to remove. The ANC convened an extended special National Executive Committee meeting that started on Thursday at the Birchwood Hotel and OR Tambo Conference Centre in Boksburg to evaluate its performance in the local government elections. In its statement of 13 November, the party said its negotiation teams had been mandated to engage with all political parties, large and small, independent candidates and civic movements in municipalities with hung councils. In other words, while the resignation argument raged outside, the NEC's immediate business was survival in local government: forming workable administrations in the 127 of 213 municipalities that, by one count, have no outright majority.

Those two tracks, leadership accountability and coalition bargaining, cannot be kept apart for long. A party negotiating coalitions from weakness needs negotiators whose authority is not in question, and partners who believe the people across the table can deliver their own organisation. If the top seven remain under a public cloud, every coalition agreement

carries an extra uncertainty. If they step down in haste, the party enters delicate local negotiations in the middle of a leadership contest. That dilemma, rather than any single speech, is what the NEC must resolve as it works towards rebuilding ahead of the 2029 general election.

South Africa's voters, meanwhile, are judging on services, not statements. Local government is where the state touches daily life most directly: water, electricity, sanitation, roads and refuse removal. The ANC's decline has been driven, in the analysis of many South African commentators, by frustration with exactly those services, alongside national concerns about jobs and corruption. A leadership change that did not improve a broken water system would not restore trust, and a leadership that stays while visibly fixing such systems might yet recover some of it. Accountability and delivery must therefore be argued together, not traded against each other.

The coming days will show which argument prevails. A comprehensive update on coalition engagements has been promised, and the resignation calls show no sign of fading while the review continues. What is already clear is that the ANC can no longer rely on its liberation history to carry it through an election, in a country where a growing share of voters judge it purely as a governing party, and judge it harshly when it falls short. (Source: Weekend Argus)

For South Sudanese readers, the wider lesson is familiar and practical. Institutions earn trust not through announcements alone, but through dates that are kept, rules that are applied evenly, and services that reach ordinary families. When leaders explain difficult decisions openly, publish clear timetables, and invite scrutiny from citizens, churches, parties and the press, confidence grows even where disagreement remains strong. When those habits slip, rumours fill the gap and every delay or dispute is read in the worst possible light.

What happens next will therefore matter as much as what has already been said. Follow-through, in the form of published documents, funded plans, named officials responsible for delivery, and regular public updates, is the test by which voters will judge the promises now being made. Opposition parties, civil society groups and journalists will be watching for that evidence, and so will regional partners whose support depends on stability, predictability and respect for agreed rules.

(Source: Weekend Argus)

NIGERIA • ELECTIONS —

Tinubu Orders Nationwide Crackdown on Political Thuggery Ahead of 2027 Elections

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Atlantic Digest



Abuja, Nigeria (Photo: Kabusa16, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has ordered security agencies across Nigeria to intensify action against political thuggery, intimidation and other activities threatening public order as the country approaches the 2027 general elections. The presidential directive, announced on Friday, 13 November, follows a series of attacks on political gatherings, convoys and party supporters in several states, including Lagos, Cross River, Gombe, Delta, Katsina and Sokoto. In a personally signed statement released by the State House, Tinubu condemned the growing violence and called for campaigns to concentrate on competing policies, governance records and proposals for national development, rather than threats and physical confrontation.

The statement, titled in the spirit of shunning violence and making campaigns about issues that promote the welfare of the people, gave security agencies clear political backing to act. The president said agencies had his authorisation to act decisively against individuals or groups engaging in political violence, warning politicians and their supporters that his administration will not tolerate violence or attempts to disrupt the democratic process. That language, reported on Saturday, 14 November, was deliberately public: it was addressed as much to party organisers who hire or tolerate strong-arm groups as to the officers expected to stop them.

One incident gave the order its immediate context. On Thursday, 12 November, suspected political thugs disrupted a scheduled town hall meeting of the Nigeria Democratic Congress in the Oregun area of Ikeja, Lagos State. Opposition figures condemned that attack, and the episode was cited in reporting as part of a wider pattern of disruption accompanying political activities in different parts of the country. The situation has generated accusations and counter-accusations between the ruling All Progressives

Congress and opposition parties, each blaming the other for creating an atmosphere in which violence pays.

Human rights reporting has added weight to the concern. Amnesty International Nigeria reported more than 127 incidents of politically motivated violence across 11 states since 19 August 2026, identifying Bauchi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Cross River, Delta, Katsina, Kaduna, Kebbi, Sokoto and Lagos among the affected states. That figure, published on 14 November, raises questions about the safety of political participation well before formal campaigning reaches its peak. When attendance at a town hall or a party meeting carries a risk of attack, the right to organise, which every democratic election depends on, is already being narrowed.

The test of the president's order will be even-handed enforcement. A crackdown that falls only on opposition supporters would deepen the very mistrust it claims to cure, while one that protects every party's lawful meetings, investigates attacks promptly, and prosecutes organisers as well as hired hands would send a different signal. Nigeria's security agencies operate under intense political scrutiny during election seasons, and their credibility depends on visible neutrality: the same response to an attack on a ruling-party event as to an attack on an opposition event, and the same willingness to arrest a well-connected sponsor as an unknown assailant.

Political leaders also carry a responsibility that no police order can replace. Parties choose their words, their organisers and their red lines. Rhetoric that treats an election as war invites followers to act accordingly, while rhetoric that treats opponents as legitimate competitors lowers the temperature in which thuggery thrives. Tinubu's call for campaigns about issues is therefore a standard his own party will be judged by, as well as a demand on others. Civil society groups, traditional and religious leaders, and the media can reinforce it by refusing to normalise violence as an ordinary part of Nigerian politics.

It is important to be precise about what has, and has not, happened. The announcement is a presidential instruction and a public commitment; the reporting reviewed for this article contains no evidence that a nationwide arrest operation had already commenced, or that new rules governing the use of force had been introduced. Effectiveness will depend on subsequent actions by the police and other authorised institutions, and on whether victims see investigations and prosecutions follow. Nigerians preparing to vote in 2027 will judge the order by whether they can attend a rally, a town hall or a polling station in safety. (Source: Atlantic Digest)

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(Source: Atlantic Digest)

NIGERIA • PLATEAU STATE —

Tinubu Pledges in Jos to Rebuild Plateau Communities and Bring Displaced People Home

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: The Matrix Newspapers



Abuja, Nigeria (Photo: Kabusa16, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

President Bola Tinubu has pledged to rebuild communities devastated by violence in Plateau State and to facilitate the return of displaced residents to their ancestral homes, as he assured Nigerians that his administration is taking steps to strengthen security ahead of the 2027 general election. Speaking on Saturday, 14 November 2026, during the All Progressives Congress North-Central presidential campaign rally at Zaria Road Stadium in Jos, the president addressed thousands of residents and supporters. He also apologised for a previous visit to the state when security constraints limited his movement strictly to the airport, a memory that still shapes how many Plateau residents judge the federal government's presence.

That earlier trip, in April 2026, followed severe communal violence recorded in March 2026, including a deadly attack in Anguwan Rukuba, in Jos North Local Government Area,

which left at least 20 people dead and several others injured. A president confined to an airport during a moment of grief can appear distant, whatever the security advice behind the decision, and Tinubu's apology acknowledged that perception directly. By returning to address a stadium crowd in the city itself, and by naming the failure plainly, he sought to reset a relationship in a state where trust in federal protection has been repeatedly tested by cycles of violence and displacement.

The pledges made in Jos were specific in their themes, if not yet in published detail. The president said the federal government will rebuild destroyed communities and facilitate the safe return of displaced residents. He announced that 1,000 forest guards are currently undergoing training, and that surveillance cameras have been procured to boost security in the state. He assured Nigerians of peaceful 2027 elections, in language reported as dismissing those who would disrupt them. Plateau State Governor Caleb Mutfwang, who attended the rally, pledged support for the president and sought completion of a stadium project described as 40 years old, linking local development demands directly to the national political bargain on display.

The rally was a major political gathering for the ruling APC in the North-Central zone, attended by Vice President Kashim Shettima, Senate President Godswill Akpabio, APC National Chairman Nentawe Yilwatda and Governor Mutfwang, among others. That line-up underlines Plateau's electoral importance, and it also raises the standard by which the pledges will be judged. A promise made by a president alone can be filed as rhetoric; a promise made before the vice president, the Senate president, the party chairman and the state governor, in front of the displaced communities' own neighbours, creates witnesses who can be reminded of it, in public, until it is kept.

Opposition voices were not absent from the day's national conversation. Reporting of the Jos event noted counter-arguments from former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, including proposals on oil exploration, subsidy restoration and revival of the Mambilla project, a reminder that the 2027 contest is already being fought on competing records and competing offers. For Plateau voters, however, the most immediate measure is not a national manifesto but a local one: can a displaced family return, rebuild, farm, send children to school, and sleep without fear? Rebuilding houses without restoring that security would fail, as would security operations that never translate into homes, clinics and markets restored.

Safe return is a demanding programme, not a slogan. It requires clearing and securing villages, resolving the land and property questions that displacement leaves behind, replacing documents, restoring water and power, and supporting people who have lost harvests, tools and savings. It also requires justice and reconciliation work, because neighbours must live together after violence, and returns imposed without local agreement can reignite the tensions that caused flight in the first place. The forest guards and surveillance cameras the president announced address one part of that picture, early warning and presence, but the civilian parts of return will decide whether it lasts.

The summary of the Jos rally published on Sunday morning, 15 November, placed Plateau at the top of the national news agenda, and rightly so. What was promised there speaks to a question facing many Nigerian communities, not only in Plateau: whether the state can protect its citizens equally, and whether displacement is treated as a temporary emergency to be ended, or as a permanent fact to be managed. Displaced families listening to the speech will now watch for budgets, timelines and the first rebuilt homes. (Source: The Matrix Newspapers)

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(Source: The Matrix Newspapers)

NIGERIA • INCLUSION —

Tinubu Urges Greater Women's Political Inclusion Ahead of 2027 Elections

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: The Sun Nigeria



Abuja, Nigeria (Photo: Kabusa16, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

President Bola Tinubu has called for greater political inclusion of women, urging them to strengthen solidarity and support networks to secure more opportunities in leadership and governance ahead of the 2027 general elections. He said Nigerian women must play more active roles in democratic nation-building, decision-making and peacebuilding, stressing that their participation is essential to strengthening democracy and promoting national stability, and that no nation can prosper by leaving half its population behind. The message, published on Sunday, 15 November, places women's representation firmly inside the early argument about what kind of election 2027 should be, and who it should be open to.

Tinubu spoke through the Director-General of the Maryam Babangida National Centre for Women Development, Adedayo Benjamins-Laniyi, at the maiden Nigeria Women for Peace and Democracy Summit and Awards 2026, organised by the National Council of Women's Societies in Abuja. The summit's theme was women as catalysts for peace, democracy and inclusive governance. The Minister of Women Affairs and Social Development, Hajiya Imaan Sulaiman-Ibrahim, was among the senior figures associated with the event, which combined policy discussion with awards recognising women's contributions. The NCWS used the occasion to press for stronger representation of women in political and governance structures.

The president's appeal was directed in part at women themselves: build solidarity, and build support networks that carry candidates through the expensive, demanding reality of Nigerian politics. That emphasis recognises a practical truth. Formal eligibility to stand for office means little if nomination processes, campaign finance, party structures and personal security all tilt against women candidates. Networks that mentor aspirants, raise funds, provide visibility and defend women against the particular abuse often directed at them in public life are infrastructure, as real in their effect as a party secretariat or a campaign office.

At the same time, advocates will note that solidarity among women cannot by itself change rules set by parties and legislatures. Reserved-seat proposals, party quotas, nomination-fee waivers, transparent primaries and enforcement against electoral violence all require decisions by institutions still dominated by men. A presidential call for inclusion therefore creates an opening, but also a test: whether the ruling party's own candidate lists for 2027, its appointments, and its support for pending representation reforms reflect the standard the president has now stated in public, in an election season when every party's list will be scrutinised constituency by constituency.

Nigeria's debate is part of a wider African conversation. Across the continent, women's parliamentary representation varies enormously, from countries that use constitutional quotas to those that rely on voluntary party measures, and the evidence consistently links broader representation to legislatures that give more sustained attention to health, education, social protection and local services. None of that diminishes the central democratic argument, which needs no supporting statistic: women are citizens, entitled to represent and to be represented, and a democracy that systematically under-represents half its people is describing itself incompletely.

The peace and democracy framing of the Abuja summit also deserves attention. Women's organisations in Nigeria have long done mediation, voter education, election observation and community peacebuilding work, often with little recognition and less funding. Connecting that record to formal political inclusion, as the summit's theme did, challenges the habit of praising women's peace work while excluding them from the rooms where budgets, security policy and electoral rules are decided. The awards presented at the summit recognised past contributions; the political question for 2027 is whether recognition will be converted into candidacies, winnable seats and appointments with real authority.

With the general elections approaching, the timetable for any party that is serious about inclusion is already short. Aspirants must be identified, supported and put through primaries; barriers that are only discussed after lists close are barriers that have already done their work. Women's groups listening to the president's message will therefore be looking, in the coming months, for concrete party decisions rather than further speeches, and voters will be able to count the result for themselves when the candidate lists are published. (Source: The Sun Nigeria)

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(Source: The Sun Nigeria)

SUDAN • HUMANITARIAN —

Sudan Aid Cuts Leave 900,000 Without WFP Food Support as Hunger Crisis Deepens

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: The Tower Post



Refugee assistance (Photo: UNHCR, CC BY 2.0, via Openverse)

Funding shortages have removed an estimated 900,000 people from World Food Programme assistance in Sudan over recent months, the agency said on 12 November, in a warning reported on Saturday, 14 November. WFP said it was reaching just over three million people, compared with more than four million in August. Its executive director delivered the warning after his first field mission, during which he met displaced families. The contraction of relief operations now sits alongside continuing fighting as a central threat to families already struggling to obtain food, in a war that has made Sudan the site of the world's largest humanitarian and displacement crisis.

The appeal that accompanied the warning seeks 520 million dollars to provide food and nutrition assistance to 5.4 million people through April 2027. That target itself tells a sobering story: even if fully funded, it would reach only a fraction of those in need. A joint statement by the International Organization for Migration and UNHCR put total need far higher, with 33.7 million people dependent on humanitarian aid, and the United Nations Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan requiring 2.9 billion dollars, of which only about 47 per cent had been raised in the reporting reviewed this week. Warehouses of emergency shelter and basic household goods have been depleted by the same funding gaps.

The hunger figures behind the appeal are severe. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis released in May found nearly 19.5 million people facing crisis-level hunger or worse during February to May 2026, with famine confirmed in pockets of the country and the risk of famine persisting, according to a joint warning by FAO, WFP and UNICEF. That assessment estimated that 825,000 children under five would experience severe acute malnutrition during 2026. Damage to markets, farming, health facilities and water systems links each of those numbers to the war's destruction of the ordinary systems by which people feed themselves, long before they ever reach an aid distribution point.

Displacement multiplies the pressure. The International Organization for Migration's snapshot covering late August through September recorded about 8.59 million internally displaced people across all 18 states, while broader counts that include those who have fled to neighbouring countries put the total forced from their homes well above 13 million. Disruption to Red Sea transport routes is increasing fuel and fertiliser costs, adding pressure beyond the immediate combat zones, and rising prices squeeze the purchasing power even of families who still have an income. In such conditions, removing 900,000 people from food assistance is not an administrative adjustment; for many households it is the loss of the last reliable meal.

Violence continues to shape what aid can be delivered, and where. The International Committee of the Red Cross warned on 22 October that aerial attacks, many likely involving armed drones, were increasing civilian harm, stressing that using drones does not alter the rules governing attacks. Hospitals supported by the organisation had recorded more than 2,700 weapon-wounded patients during the first half of 2026. On 23 October the United Kingdom and 31 other international partners issued a joint statement on the looming famine, calling on the warring parties to allow unimpeded humanitarian access and to refrain from attacks on civilian infrastructure, a call that aid agencies say remains unmet in much of the country.

The Sudanese government based in Khartoum, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's Sudanese Armed Forces, has rejected warnings of famine, saying in a statement dated 26 October that the food situation is reassuring and that government reserves and ongoing agricultural production are sufficient. That claim sits in sharp tension with the IPC analysis, the UN agencies' field reporting, and the testimony of displaced families met by the WFP leadership. For a newspaper's readers, the responsible course is to report both the claim and the evidence against it, and to note that independent access, which would settle the argument, is exactly what the fighting restricts.

Sudan's war, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has now lasted more than three and a half years. The Peace for Sudan Platform's appeal on 5 November, calling for an end to attacks on civilians, markets, hospitals and water and electricity supplies, reflects how completely civilian life has become the battlefield. Until fighting ends and access opens, appeals like WFP's are attempts to keep people alive inside a crisis that politics created and only politics can close. Donors deciding whether to fund the 520 million dollars are, in effect, deciding how many of those people eat. (Source: The Tower Post)

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(Source: The Tower Post)

GHANA • ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNANCE —

Ghana Catholic Bishops Demand Targeted State of Emergency on Galamsey

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Noble News



Accra, Ghana (Photo: Synth85, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

The Ghana Catholic Bishops' Conference has called on President John Dramani Mahama to declare a targeted state of emergency in the areas most affected by illegal and irresponsible mining, known as galamsey, saying the government's interventions so far are not producing the desired results. The call was contained in a communiqué issued at the end of the Conference's Annual Plenary Assembly, held at the Divine Providence Pastoral Centre at Jamasi, in the Konongo-Mampong Diocese in the Ashanti Region, from 3 to 14 November 2026. The communiqué was issued on Friday, 13 November, and signed by the President of the Conference, Most Rev. Matthew Kwasi Gyamfi, Catholic Bishop of Sunyani.

The bishops' language was unusually direct. They said they remain deeply concerned about the devastation caused by galamsey, particularly the pollution of water bodies, destruction of forest reserves, degradation of agricultural land and threats to public health. Considering that the interventions put in place by the government are so far not producing the desired, promised and expected end of the menace, they concluded that it is now time to declare a targeted state of emergency in the locations most affected. The word targeted matters: the demand is not for emergency rule across Ghana, but for extraordinary powers focused on the mining hotspots where ordinary enforcement has failed.

Galamsey has resisted successive governments' campaigns because it sits at the junction of poverty, politics and profit. Illegal mining provides income in communities with few alternatives, finances flow through networks that can include powerful backers, and enforcement operations have repeatedly displaced miners temporarily without dismantling the trade. Meanwhile the damage accumulates in rivers that communities drink from, in farmland that will not recover quickly, and in public health costs borne by people who never touched a mining pit. The bishops, whose parishes and schools serve many of the affected communities, speak from that ground-level experience, which is part of why their intervention carries weight beyond church politics.

The communiqué ranged wider than mining. The bishops raised alarm over drugs, school abuse and conflicts, and said they are deeply disturbed by the persistence of conflicts and communal tensions in various parts of the country, particularly in Bawku and Kalba-Gbinyiri. The assembly's theme, preparing the Catholic Church in Ghana for her 150th anniversary in 2030, framed those concerns as a national examination of conscience as much as a policy list. A church preparing to celebrate a century and a half in Ghana was, in effect, asking what condition the country itself will be in when that anniversary arrives.

Other Ghanaian voices have made similar demands. Anti-galamsey campaigners, including figures such as Ken Ashigbey, have urged the president to declare a state of

emergency in galamsey hotspots, and the issue featured in public debate throughout the week in which the bishops met. That convergence matters politically. When religious leaders, professional bodies and campaigners reach the same conclusion from different starting points, a government can no longer treat the demand as a partisan attack. It becomes a question about the state's capacity to protect water, land and law in the face of an illegal economy that has learned to outlast enforcement cycles.

A state of emergency, if declared, would still need careful design to succeed where previous operations have not. Emergency powers could clear mining sites and protect rivers, but lasting success would require prosecution of financiers as well as labourers, restoration of polluted land and water, alternative livelihoods for young people drawn into the pits, and protection for chiefs, officials and journalists who resist the trade locally. Without those elements, an emergency could become another dramatic pause followed by a return to business as usual, a pattern Ghanaians have seen before and which the bishops' communiqué implicitly warns against.

The government has not, in the reporting reviewed for this article, announced such a declaration in response to the bishops. Its next steps will be watched closely, not only by environmental campaigners but by every community whose water has changed colour. The bishops have placed a moral institution's authority behind a specific, limited and testable demand. Whether Accra accepts it, rejects it, or offers an alternative with equal force, it will have to answer the evidence the bishops cited: polluted rivers, destroyed forests, degraded farms and a public that was promised an end to the menace. (Source: Noble News)

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(Source: Noble News)

KENYA • 2027 ELECTIONS —

Ruto Brings 1,500 UDA and ODM Mobilisers Together at State House in Nairobi Push

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Daily Nation



Nairobi skyline, Kenya (Photo: Timothy A. Gonsalves, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

President William Ruto has intensified efforts to consolidate his political support ahead of Kenya's 2027 General Election, bringing together approximately 1,500 leaders and grassroots mobilisers from the United Democratic Alliance and the Orange Democratic Movement at State House in Nairobi. The meeting, held on Friday, 13 November and reported on Saturday, 14 November, brought together elected leaders, political aspirants and grassroots mobilisers from the two formations as they began laying the groundwork for a coordinated campaign strategy in the capital. It comes amid growing political realignments and renewed efforts by opposition leaders to build a united front capable of challenging the government.

According to reporting by the Daily Nation, the president challenged the leaders to combine their political networks and grassroots structures to strengthen their influence in Nairobi ahead of 2027. The Star's reporting on the discussions described a joint political mobilisation strategy involving UDA and ODM grassroots networks, while Citizen Digital reported that Ruto and ODM National Chairperson Gladys Wanga were seeking to calm growing tensions within the broad-based government arrangement following recent defections and disagreements over political zoning. In a statement following the meeting, Ruto said the two parties had committed to using their respective structures to strengthen cooperation in Nairobi, alongside accelerated development programmes on affordable housing, modern markets, roads, drainage, water and sanitation.

Nairobi is worth this effort because it is both a prize and a warning. The capital's governorship is already generating competition inside the broad-based arrangement itself, with Governor Johnson Sakaja, who recently moved from UDA to ODM, positioning himself for another term. A coalition that cannot agree on who carries its banner in the capital, or on

how wards and constituencies are zoned between its partners, will struggle to present itself as a government rather than a negotiation. The State House meeting was therefore as much about managing the alliance's internal rivalries as about confronting the opposition outside it.

The opposition context sharpens the urgency, even where this article deliberately sets aside the polling detail covered in earlier editions. Opposition leaders are working to establish a united front, new political formations are taking shape, and Nairobi's voters have repeatedly shown a willingness to punish incumbents. A mobilisation structure built early, combining two parties' ward-level networks, is an attempt to convert the broad-based government's incumbency into organisation before that opposition front settles on candidates and a message. Whether 1,500 mobilisers in a State House meeting become an enduring structure, or a photograph, depends on the unglamorous follow-up of ward meetings, registration drives and dispute resolution between the partners.

Kenya's broad-based arrangement, which brought ODM into cooperation with Ruto's government, has always contained this tension. It widened the government's support and lowered the temperature after a period of protest and division, but it also blurred accountability, left supporters of both parties unsure what their party now stands for, and created exactly the zoning and defection disputes reported this week. Managing those disputes in Nairobi, the most visible political stage in the country, is a test of whether the arrangement can survive contact with an actual election, in which partners must eventually ask voters for a single, coherent mandate.

Development delivery is the other half of the strategy announced after the meeting, and it is the half voters can verify without attending any rally. Affordable housing sites, modern markets, road works, drainage, water and sanitation improvements in Nairobi are either visible by 2027 or they are not. The government's wager is that visible delivery, organised by a joint mobilisation machine, outweighs the opposition's argument that the broad-based deal served politicians first. The opposition's counter-wager is that voters will judge the arrangement by prices, jobs and services in their own estates, whatever the mobilisers say.

For now, the fact of the meeting is the news: the president personally convening his own party and its governing partner, in the capital, more than a year before the vote, and publicly committing both to a shared structure. Kenyan elections are rarely won in a single meeting, but they are often lost by alliances that postpone their internal arguments until candidates, zones and slogans can no longer be changed. State House has chosen to have its arguments early. (Source: Daily Nation)

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(Source: Daily Nation)

KENYA • OPPOSITION —

Kalonzo Says He Will Sacrifice Ambition to Unite Opposition and Deny Ruto a Second Term

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: People Daily



Nairobi skyline, Kenya (Photo: Timothy A. Gonsalves, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Wiper Patriotic Front leader Kalonzo Musyoka has responded to former Nairobi Governor Mike Sonko's advice that he should join President William Ruto's government if he is not selected as the opposition's presidential flagbearer for the 2027 General Election, reaffirming his commitment to the opposition and declaring that he is prepared to sacrifice his presidential ambitions if doing so would help unite the opposition and prevent Ruto from securing a second term. Kalonzo spoke on Saturday, 14 November 2026, during the burial ceremony of Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua's sister, a setting that itself illustrated the fluid, personal networks through which Kenyan coalition politics is conducted.

Sonko's proposal, as Kalonzo described it, was bluntly transactional. If the opposition does not give him the opportunity to be its presidential flagbearer, Sonko argued, he should not gamble again; he would be better off becoming Ruto's deputy president or prime minister, negotiating a senior government position rather than pursuing another uncertain presidential bid. The suggestion reflects a familiar Kenyan political logic, in which a leader's support base is treated as a bargaining asset to be placed with whichever side offers the best terms, and it is precisely that logic Kalonzo publicly rejected.

His answer was framed as a covenant with the opposition and its voters. He said that if it is not him, and he is guaranteed that the choice does not make a mistake, the priority must be ensuring that the united effort does not end up giving Ruto a second term, which he described as a terrible outcome. He referenced Jubilee Party interim leader Fred Matiang'i and former Chief Justice David Maraga in his remarks, pointing to the wider consultations among leaders as the opposition weighs who should carry its ticket. The names matter: they show a field of possible standard-bearers and kingmakers considerably wider than a single candidacy, and a negotiation that is still genuinely open.

Kalonzo's position comes as opposition leaders navigate competing presidential ambitions and efforts to establish a united front against Ruto in 2027. That navigation is the central strategic problem of Kenyan opposition politics. A divided opposition facing an incumbent who is already organising a two-party mobilisation machine, as this week's State House meeting showed, risks splitting the anti-incumbent vote across several candidacies and losing an election that a united ticket might win. Every opposition leader knows this arithmetic; the difficulty is that each also knows their own claim to lead the ticket, and stepping aside is costlier, personally and politically, than urging others to do so.

That is what gives Kalonzo's statement its significance, and also its limits. A public willingness to sacrifice ambition, stated at a burial before political peers, raises the price of later refusing a collective decision, and it puts pressure on rival aspirants to make matching commitments. But it is conditional in an important way: he asked for a guarantee that the chosen alternative does not make a mistake. Who gives that guarantee, and by what process, a convention, a negotiated pact, an opinion-tested selection, remains undecided. Until the opposition agrees that process, unity remains a sentiment shared by its leaders rather than a mechanism binding on them.

Sonko's intervention, meanwhile, reveals the government's opportunity. Every month the opposition spends negotiating with itself is a month in which figures like Kalonzo can be courted, tempted or portrayed as wavering, and in which the broad-based government's offer of office remains open as an alternative to opposition discipline. By rejecting that offer in public, Kalonzo closed one such opening, at least for now, and denied the government the propaganda value of a senior opposition figure crossing over. Whether other opposition figures, under similar pressure and similar offers, will do the same is one of the quiet questions that will shape the next year.

The question of who carries the opposition's presidential ticket therefore remains central to Kenya's political debate, but this weekend clarified the terms on which at least one major contender will accept the answer. Kalonzo has said, on the record, that defeating Ruto matters more than his own candidacy. If the opposition eventually unites and wins, that statement will be remembered as an act of discipline. If it fragments, it will be remembered as the moment the standard was set, and not met. (Source: People Daily)

For South Sudanese readers, the wider lesson is familiar and practical. Institutions earn trust not through announcements alone, but through dates that are kept, rules that are applied evenly, and services that reach ordinary families. When leaders explain difficult decisions openly, publish clear timetables, and invite scrutiny from citizens, churches, parties and the press, confidence grows even where disagreement remains strong. When those habits slip, rumours fill the gap and every delay or dispute is read in the worst possible light.

What happens next will therefore matter as much as what has already been said. Follow-through, in the form of published documents, funded plans, named officials responsible for delivery, and regular public updates, is the test by which voters will judge the promises now being made. Opposition parties, civil society groups and journalists will be watching for that evidence, and so will regional partners whose support depends on stability, predictability and respect for agreed rules.

(Source: People Daily)

SUNDAY FEATURES

HEALTH IN FOCUS —

Aid Cuts Put Water, Sanitation and Basic Care at Risk for 150,000 Displaced People in Bentiu and Malakal

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)



Displaced families in South Sudan (Photo: USAID, public domain)

About 150,000 displaced people in South Sudan's Bentiu and Malakal camps risk losing the water, sanitation and primary health care on which daily life depends, as funding cuts and the withdrawal of aid organisations hollow out services, Médecins Sans Frontières warned in reporting published this weekend. The warning is stark because the people affected are not, in the main, free to solve the problem by leaving. Many residents cannot safely return home, MSF said, while the services that remain in the camps risk collapse without new funding. It is, in other words, a crisis of basics: clean water, working latrines, handwashing, desludging and a clinic that stays open.

The figures from Bentiu describe how thin those basics have become. Around sixty people share each functioning latrine, MSF's assessment found, and just 109 handwashing stations serve approximately 111,000 residents. Numbers like those are not an abstraction. They describe queues, breakdowns and the daily arithmetic of dignity, and they explain why health workers worry so quickly about disease. Where water is scarce and sanitation is overstretched, a preventable illness does not need much help to spread, and crowded displacement sites give it every opportunity.

Malakal faces a deadline of its own. Without new funding, MSF warned, the water supply for some 40,000 people could stop, along with the desludging of around 900 latrines. Desludging is unglamorous work that rarely makes a headline, yet it is the kind of invisible maintenance on which public health rests. When it stops, latrines fill, facilities close, and the ratio that already stands at sixty people per working latrine in Bentiu can only worsen wherever the same pressures apply. Camp systems fail gradually, then suddenly, and usually in that order.

Cholera hangs over the whole picture. Working with the Ministry of Health, MSF vaccinated 102,251 people against cholera in Bentiu in September, a large campaign by any measure. But the organisation was explicit about the limit of that achievement: vaccination alone cannot prevent future outbreaks. Since 2024, South Sudan has recorded almost 110,000 cholera cases and 1,970 deaths, according to the figures cited in MSF's reporting. A vaccine campaign can buy time and save lives. It cannot substitute for clean water, and it was never meant to.

That distinction matters for how this story should be read. It is tempting to treat a vaccination total above one hundred thousand as a problem solved, a box ticked in a difficult year. MSF's warning points the other way. The campaign in Bentiu was a success that exposed the fragility around it: the same population still depends on overstretched latrines, too few handwashing stations and water systems whose funding is running out. Prevention, in a camp, is mostly plumbing, trucking, maintenance and staffing, repeated every day without interruption. When the money falters, the repetition stops.

The wider context is a country carrying several emergencies at once. South Sudan hosts people displaced by its own conflicts and many who have fled the war in neighbouring Sudan, and its health system was stretched long before the latest cuts. Other humanitarian reporting this autumn, including the United Nations humanitarian snapshot for October, has described cholera transmission persisting in a number of counties even as cases declined nationally, alongside continuing public-health alerts. MSF's camp-level warning fits that pattern: national trends can improve while particular places, crowded and underfunded, remain one breakdown away from an outbreak.

There is also a question of timing. Aid organisations plan water and sanitation work in cycles, and a funding gap does not announce itself on the day the money runs out. It appears first as a postponed repair, a route not run, a post not filled, a desludging visit deferred. By the time a water supply actually stops for 40,000 people, the failure has been building for weeks. That is why MSF is raising the alarm now, while the services in Bentiu and Malakal are strained rather than gone, and while new funding could still prevent the collapse it describes.

For residents, the stakes are immediate and personal. A mother in Bentiu does not experience a funding shortfall as a percentage in a donor capital. She experiences it as a longer walk for water, a dirtier latrine, a child with diarrhoea and a

clinic under pressure. The 150,000 figure in MSF's warning is large, but the harm it points to is granular, counted in households. Keeping water running and latrines emptied is not a secondary, soft kind of aid. In a displacement camp, it is front-line medicine.

What happens next depends on decisions taken far from the camps themselves. MSF has set out the need plainly: new funding, before Malakal's water supply and desludging stop and before Bentiu's overstretched facilities are pushed past working point. The September vaccination campaign showed what a funded, organised response can do in a matter of weeks. The warning published this weekend shows the opposite: what begins to unravel when the funding behind the unglamorous essentials is withdrawn, and nobody steps in to replace it.

Health workers have a phrase for situations like this: a foreseeable emergency. Nothing in MSF's account suggests the risk in Bentiu and Malakal is hidden or surprising. The ratios are measured, the deadlines are named and the remedy, continued funding for water, sanitation and primary care, is neither experimental nor unclear. Foreseeable emergencies are the kind the world has the least excuse for allowing to happen.

(Source: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF))

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY —

IGAD's Early-Warning Chiefs Approve a 2026–2030 Strategic Focus at a First Meeting Hosted by Somalia

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: IGAD



Mogadishu, Somalia (Photo: NASA, public domain, Wikimedia Commons)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has used a meeting in Mogadishu to reset the work of its conflict early-warning system for the rest of the decade, approving a strategic focus for 2026 to 2030 and a new regional conflict profiling report. IGAD said its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, known as CEWARN, convened the 18th meeting of its Committee of Permanent Secretaries on 12 November in the Somali capital, to review progress and give policy guidance on early warning and response across the Horn of Africa. The communiqué was published by the bloc on 14 November.

The setting carried weight of its own. Reporting on the meeting noted that this was the first time Somalia had held the regional gathering, a milestone Somali officials described as important in the country's participation in regional peace and security work. The meeting was closed by Somalia's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Hamza Adan Haadow. A host country that spent decades as the subject of other people's security meetings was, this week, chairing the region's conversation about how to spot the next crisis before it starts.

The opening session brought together the people who run the system. IGAD listed remarks from Haadow; from Mohamed Abdi Ware, the bloc's Deputy Executive Secretary; from Hassan Omar Mohamed of Djibouti's foreign ministry, who chaired the 18th meeting; and from Commander Abebe Muluneh, Director of IGAD's Peace and Security Division. CEWARN's Director, Camlus Omogo, presented an update on the mechanism's activities between July 2023 and October 2026 and an overview of the 2026 to 2030 strategic focus, which the committee went on to approve.

Delegates also reviewed what had happened to the resolutions of the previous meeting, the 17th, held in Mombasa, Kenya, in July 2023, and considered the report and recommendations of the 21st Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response, which had met in Mogadishu the day before, on 11 November. The committee approved the draft Regional Conflict Profiling and Scenario Building Report. In IGAD's structure, the technical committee makes recommendations and the permanent secretaries exercise oversight and set strategic direction, a chain the Mogadishu meetings were designed to keep moving.

CEWARN itself is not new. IGAD recalled that it was established under a protocol signed in January 2002, to support cooperation among member states in collecting, analysing and sharing early-warning information, and in facilitating measures to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts. Its unit works with national early-warning and response units in member states. The theory is simple enough: information gathered locally, shared regionally and acted on early is cheaper, in every currency that matters, than a peacekeeping mission deployed late.

The hard part, as reporting on the Mogadishu meeting made clear, is money and capacity. The 20th technical committee meeting in December 2025 had already flagged the growing challenge of declining and constrained funding for conflict-prevention work, alongside election-related early warning in five IGAD member states and the need to

strengthen national and sub-national structures. IGAD's institutional capacity has also been weakened by Eritrea's withdrawal from the bloc, complicating collective responses to regional crises. A strategic focus on paper does not, by itself, pay a field monitor's salary.

There were counterweights in the same reporting. Somalia's engagement with IGAD has deepened institutionally: the country ratified the revised IGAD Treaty in January 2026, helping the bloc reach the two-thirds threshold needed to bring the updated framework into operation. That helps explain Mogadishu's hosting role this week. The bloc's newest framework is being operated, in part, by a member state rebuilding its own institutions while still fighting an insurgency at home, a combination that gives the early-warning agenda both credibility and urgency.

IGAD said the Mogadishu meeting took place amid changing geopolitical dynamics, climate-related security risks and emerging threats affecting its member states, and that its outcomes are expected to strengthen coordination between the CEWARN unit, national units and member states. Climate is not a decorative word in that sentence. Across the Horn, drought, flood and competition over pasture and water feed directly into local conflict, which is precisely the kind of slow-building pressure an early-warning system exists to catch while it is still manageable.

For South Sudan, a member state preparing for its first national elections, the agenda is not distant. Election-related early warning was named among the priorities in the run-up to this week's approvals, and South Sudan's own calendar has just been rearranged, with registration under way and voting now set for February. Systems like CEWARN matter most in exactly such seasons, when local tensions can travel fast and a credible regional channel for information can make the difference between a rumour and a response.

The documents approved in Mogadishu are, as one assessment put it, a start. The funding and political will to implement them are not yet evident, and early warning has a built-in paradox: when it works, nothing happens, and nothing is hard to fund. But the Horn of Africa has paid, repeatedly and recently, for the opposite approach. This week's meeting was the region's institutions doing the quiet, unglamorous work of trying to see the next emergency coming, and saying so on the record.

(Source: IGAD)

AFRICAN ELECTIONS —

Cabo Verde Votes for a President Today, Testing 35 Years of Peaceful Democracy

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: The Conversation via PanAfrican News Media

Voters in Cabo Verde choose a president today, Sunday 15 November, in an election that much of Africa will watch with something close to envy. The Atlantic archipelago of about 530,000 people has held competitive multiparty elections for more than three decades, with peaceful transfers of power and no coups since independence from Portugal in 1975. Six candidates are contesting the presidency. The incumbent, José Maria Neves, is seeking a second five-year term, and reporting ahead of polling described him as favoured to win it.

His main challenger carries a first of her own. Joana Rosa, a former justice minister supported by the Movement for Democracy, the MpD, is the first woman to run for president in Cabo Verde. Four other candidates are also standing. A second round is provided for if no candidate wins an outright majority, with a runoff date of 29 November in the electoral calendar. Polling arrangements extend well beyond the islands themselves, because Cabo Verde's electorate, like its population, is spread across the world.

The numbers tell that story. Registration figures cited in pre-election analysis put the electorate at roughly 426,531 voters, including about 76,898 abroad, some 18 percent of the total. The diaspora is estimated to be nearly three times larger than the population living in the country, and its remittances and votes are woven into national life. Cabo Verdeans vote in African, European and American communities as well as at home, and the constitution even limits how much an exceptionally large overseas vote can weigh.

The election's real test, analysts say, is institutional. Cabo Verde is a semi-presidential republic: the directly elected president represents the state, guards the constitution and can veto laws or, in some conditions, dissolve parliament, while government runs through a prime minister answerable to the National Assembly. In May 2026, the African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde, the PAICV, returned to government by winning the parliamentary election, taking 37 of 72 seats against 33 for the MpD and two for the UCID, and ending ten years of MpD rule. Turnout in May was just 46.5 percent.

That result rearranged the presidency's context. Neves, prime minister from 2001 to 2016, is historically associated with the PAICV and is backed by it, so a victory for him would align the presidency with the new governing party. A victory for Rosa would produce cohabitation, a president and a government from rival camps sharing power under the constitution's rules. José Santana Pereira, an associate professor at the University of Lisbon who studies the country's presidential elections, wrote that the vote will test how well its institutions work when power is shared. Either outcome, in other words, is a live examination of the system.

The campaign itself was fought on the material questions of island life. Reporting listed jobs, emigration and economic development at its centre, with candidates pressed on rising living costs, youth unemployment and social inequality. Tourism contributes about a quarter of the economy, and the country drew international attention this year through its national football team's historic World Cup debut and run to the knockout stages. Economic indicators cited in pre-election analysis pointed to growth of 6.4 percent year on year in the first quarter of 2026 and a forecast of 5.3 percent for the year, against public debt forecast near 94 percent of GDP and poverty above half the population.

Emigration deserves its own sentence, because in Cabo Verde it is not a side issue. The continued departure of young professionals seeking better opportunities abroad increases the country's reliance on its diaspora even as it drains skills from home. A president cannot set wages or create a labour market single-handedly, but the head of state frames national priorities, represents the country abroad and speaks, in a small state, with unusual directness to citizens at home and overseas. Voters choosing today are also choosing who makes that argument for the next five years.

Set against the continent's recent history, the ordinariness of this election is its distinction. Cabo Verde has had multiparty elections since 1991. Parties lose, concede and govern in turn. Its National Elections Commission supervises the vote, provides equal broadcast airtime in the campaign, and publishes results that candidates can challenge through electoral complaints and the courts. Paper ballots and staged tabulation are the machinery that makes peaceful transfers routine.

There are still things to watch once polls close. Whether registration transfers and corrections, at home and in the diaspora, were completed properly before the statutory suspension; whether complaints during roll inspection received documented decisions; and whether station totals from the islands and abroad reconcile with the published national result. Those are the standard checks of a serious election, and Cabo Verde's institutions invite them rather than fearing them. If no candidate passes the majority mark today, the top two return for the runoff on 29 November.

By tonight, counting will be under way in Praia and in consulates around the world. Whatever the result, the deeper story of this Sunday is already visible: an African country of half a million people, voting calmly for the sixth candidate or the first, in an election whose outcome nobody has announced in advance and whose loser is expected to go home. In a region that has seen too many presidencies decided by other means, that is not a small thing. It is the whole thing.

(Source: The Conversation via PanAfrican News Media)

CLIMATE AND COMMUNITIES —

Kenya Braces for Peak El Niño Rains as 1.5 Million People Face Flood Risk

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Associated Press



Nairobi skyline, Kenya (Photo: Timothy A. Gonsalves, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Kenya is preparing for the peak of its November rains with an uncomfortable number attached: about 1.5 million people could be affected by flooding from the heavy El Niño-season rainfall now arriving, according to the National Disaster Operations Centre, in an Associated Press report published on 13 November. Authorities have urged residents in flood-prone areas to move to higher ground, and preparations described in the reporting include evacuation planning, drainage clearance and emergency shelter arrangements. The forecast is a heightened risk, not a certainty for every exposed community, and officials have been careful to say so.

The calendar explains the timing. Kenya's short-rains season normally runs from October through December, and the Kenya Meteorological Department identifies November as its typical rainfall peak. Its seasonal outlook for October to December 2026 is the primary reference for what is now unfolding. Regional forecasting points the same way: the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre's outlook for 10 to 17 November identified above-normal rainfall across much of Kenya, Tanzania, southern and northern Ethiopia and southern Somalia, with parts of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda also affected.

Memory is doing much of the motivating. The World Health Organization's account of the March to May 2026 long rains records widespread flooding that, by 3 May, had affected 27 counties, killed 122 people and affected 42,259 people. Those figures are the reason a forecast, this time, is being treated as an instruction to prepare rather than a topic for debate. Communities that spent the long rains rescuing neighbours and counting losses do not need to be persuaded that November's peak deserves respect. They need drainage cleared, shelters ready and warnings that arrive in time.

The science behind the season is regional, not local. A developing El Niño event is influencing rainfall patterns across East Africa, and international hazards monitoring for the week of 12 to 18 November flagged high potential for flooding across equatorial East Africa and southern Africa, with inundation persisting in the Sudd wetlands of South Sudan and flooding likely along the Juba River in southern Somalia. The same system that fills one district's reservoir can overwhelm another district's settlement in a single night, which is why national averages are a poor guide to household risk.

South Africa's weekend underlined the point from the other end of the continent. The South African Weather Service issued an Orange Level 5 warning for severe thunderstorms for Saturday 14 November over parts of KwaZulu-Natal, the far eastern Free State and the Mpumalanga Highveld, with flooding of roads, settlements and low-lying areas and disruption to power and communications expected. East Africa's rain and southern Africa's storms are separate weather events, but they belong to the same continental season, and to the same argument about preparation: warnings only save what readiness allows them to save.

For Kenya, readiness has several practical faces. Drainage clearance in towns decides whether a downpour becomes a flood. Evacuation planning decides whether a warning becomes a movement or a panic. Emergency shelters decide what a displaced family finds at the end of that movement. The disaster operations centre's figure of 1.5 million people at risk is a planning number, the size of the population for whom those unglamorous preparations must be made in advance, county by county, rather than improvised while rivers are already rising.

There is a harder, longer question underneath the emergency work. Kenya has now flooded seriously in both its 2026 rainy seasons, and each event lands on households that had not finished recovering from the last one. A family that replaced a roof after May counts November's rain differently from a forecaster. Climate adaptation, in that lived sense, is not a conference theme. It is whether settlements are still being built in the water's path, whether warnings reach the last mile in the right language, and whether counties have money ready before the peak, not after it.

None of this makes today's rain an enemy in itself. The short rains also replenish pastures, support planting in bimodal areas and refill water stores after dry months, and farmers across the region plan their year around them. The task for authorities is narrower and more achievable than controlling the weather: keep the benefit and blunt the harm. That means watching river levels, acting on the meteorological department's regional outlooks as local conditions vary, and treating the 1.5 million figure as a reason for urgency rather than alarm.

What happens over the coming days will be decided locally, in the gap between forecast and outcome. Some of the places marked at risk will see heavy rain and cope. Others may face the flash flooding and landslides that hazards monitoring warns of when intense rain falls on saturated ground. The difference, repeatedly, is preparation made while the sky was still being discussed rather than watched. Kenya's officials have issued their warning early and in public. The reporting from Nairobi suggests a country trying, this season, to be ready before the water arrives.

That effort deserves to be judged by a simple standard: whether, when the peak rains pass, the story is about weather endured rather than warnings ignored. Kenya cannot choose its November. It can choose, and this month appears to be choosing, how much of November's damage is preventable.

(Source: Associated Press)

WORLD

United Nations · Strait of Hormuz —

Fragile Gulf Calm Tested as Security Council Meets Over Threats to Hormuz Shipping

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: UN News



UN Security Council chamber (Photo: CTBTO, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

The United Nations Security Council met on 13 November at the request of Bahrain to discuss mounting threats to regional and maritime security in the Gulf, in a session reported live by UN News. Nearly nine months after Israeli and United States strikes on Iran set off a regional war, diplomats described a Gulf that remains on a knife edge. Iran has all but closed the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that before the conflict carried about a fifth of the world's oil, and the consequences of that closure continue to ripple through energy markets, shipping routes and the economies of states far beyond the region itself.

According to the reporting, the war began on 28 February, after which Iran struck United States military assets and other targets in six Gulf states and Jordan. In March the Council adopted resolution 2817, which condemned Iran's attacks and its threats to navigation, with China and Russia abstaining. A sixty-day ceasefire between the United States and Iran, mediated by Pakistan in June, lapsed in August without a peace agreement, leaving an uneasy pause rather than a settlement. That history framed the 13 November meeting: not a crisis with a clear beginning that diplomats could still prevent, but a fragile calm that participants warned could break at any moment.

The shipping figures presented to readers underlined why the strait matters so much. Transits through Hormuz remain around sixty-five per cent below pre-conflict levels, according to UK Maritime Trade Operations, and October saw the most incidents since the war began. For shipowners, insurers and crews, those numbers translate into daily decisions about whether to sail, which route to take and what price to charge for the risk. For importing countries, they translate into higher energy costs and anxious planning. For the Gulf states that hosted the debate, they are a reminder that their ports, desalination plants and oil terminals sit within range of a conflict they did not start.

Gulf representatives used the meeting to press a case about the scale of the attacks their countries have faced. In related reporting from the session, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi, told the Council that Gulf countries have faced more than seven thousand missile and drone attacks since 28 February 2026, targeting vital installations and civilian facilities and causing deaths, injuries and widespread damage to infrastructure. He called for an immediate and unconditional halt to the attacks, accountability for those responsible, and protection for regional security and shipping routes. Those demands set out the Gulf position in clear terms ahead of any further Council action.

For readers in South Sudan and across Africa, a dispute over a distant strait can feel remote, yet its effects arrive quickly at the fuel pump and in the price of imported goods. When a fifth of the world's oil normally moves through one waterway and most of that traffic stops, markets tighten everywhere, including in landlocked and oil-producing states whose budgets depend on stable prices and predictable transport costs. South Sudan's own economy, tied to oil exports through Sudan, is exposed to exactly this kind of shock. A debate in New York about freedom of navigation is therefore also, indirectly, a debate about the cost of living in Juba, Nairobi and Abuja in the months ahead.

What happens next will depend less on one meeting than on whether the fragile calm can be turned into something more durable. The Council has already spoken once, in resolution 2817, and the 13 November session showed members returning to the same questions: how to protect shipping, how to deter further attacks, and how to prevent a lapsed ceasefire from sliding back into open war. No new settlement was reported from the meeting, and none should be assumed. What the session did confirm is that the Gulf crisis remains at the top of the Council's agenda, and that the states most affected intend to keep it there until the strait is safe again. Diplomats often use such meetings to signal positions to audiences well beyond the chamber, including markets, insurers and neighbouring capitals watching for any shift in tone. Freedom of navigation through international straits is a long-standing principle of maritime law, and its defence has repeatedly brought major powers into the same debate even when they disagree on much else. Energy traders follow Council sessions closely because even the suggestion of de-escalation, or of further closure, can move prices within hours of a statement being made. For civilian crews transiting the Gulf, the debate is not abstract: seafarers have continued to work routes that officials themselves describe as dangerous and unpredictable.

That wider setting explains why a single Council session drew attention far beyond New York. Gulf governments have spent months balancing deterrence, diplomacy and the protection of civilian infrastructure, while shipping firms have rerouted vessels and raised prices to cover war risk. Households in importing countries feel the result in transport fares and food prices, because fuel sits underneath almost every supply chain. Analysts therefore read the meeting not as an isolated debate but as one move in a longer contest over whether international law, backed by naval power and sanctions, can keep a vital trade artery open when a determined state decides to close it, and whether diplomacy can reopen it before the economic damage deepens further.

(Source: UN News)

Gaza · Khan Younis —

Eighteen Arab and Islamic Nations Condemn Strike on Nasser Medical Complex in Gaza

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Displaced families (Photo: USAID, public domain)

Foreign ministers from eighteen Arab and Islamic countries have condemned in the strongest terms an Israeli airstrike on the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, in a joint statement issued on Saturday 14 November and published by the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministers said the strike caused casualties among patients and medical personnel and violated international humanitarian law, which affords special protection to medical facilities and healthcare workers. The statement was endorsed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, Libya, Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia, Türkiye, Pakistan, Indonesia and Sudan.

Other reporting on the same strike put the human cost in sharper detail. Press TV, summarising the statement and local reporting, said the strike in the early hours of 12 November killed at least six Palestinians, including a surgeon, and left at least twenty people wounded, according to Gaza's Health Ministry and Civil Defence. The United Arab Emirates, in its own separate statement the same day, strongly condemned the airstrikes on the complex, said they resulted in the death and injury of a number of innocent people, and warned against ongoing military escalation exacerbating the humanitarian catastrophe in the Strip. The figures and the legal language together explain why this single strike drew such a broad diplomatic response.

The joint statement went beyond the hospital itself. The ministers also condemned continued Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians, including strikes on tents and other sites sheltering displaced persons, saying such attacks undermine the ceasefire and efforts to restore security and stability in Gaza and are inconsistent with President Trump's Comprehensive Plan. That linkage matters politically: the signatories were not treating the hospital strike as an isolated incident, but as part of a pattern they say is weakening an agreement that many of them have invested diplomatic effort in sustaining. Several of the signatory states have been involved, directly or indirectly, in mediation and humanitarian diplomacy around Gaza.

The ministers also expressed grave concern that continued Israeli restrictions on humanitarian aid, shelter materials including tents, caravans and mobile homes, and medical supplies are deepening Gaza's humanitarian catastrophe as winter approaches. That concern connects the politics of the statement to conditions on the ground, where displaced families face cold and rain in makeshift shelter. The statement called on Israel to heed appeals from the international community and the Board of Peace, to increase aid, and to fulfil immediately and in full its obligations under the Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement, President Trump's Comprehensive Plan and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 of 2025, including upholding the ceasefire and ensuring safe, sustained and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid in sufficient quantities.

Medical facilities occupy a particular place in the laws of war, and that is why strikes on hospitals so often become diplomatic flashpoints. Hospitals, patients and medical staff are protected so that the wounded and sick can be treated whichever side they belong to, and an attack that kills a surgeon in a surgical department strikes at a service an entire community depends on. The Nasser complex serves a large population in southern Gaza, where other facilities have been damaged or overwhelmed. When eighteen foreign ministers sign the same text, they are signalling that they regard the protection of such facilities not as a bilateral dispute but as a shared legal and moral concern.

Whether the statement changes conditions in Khan Younis will be measured in access and safety rather than in communiqués. The demands in the text are specific: uphold the ceasefire, protect civilians and medical facilities, and allow aid, shelter materials and medical supplies in sufficient quantities without impediment. Aid agencies and hospital staff will judge the response by what reaches them in the coming weeks, as winter makes the shelter question more urgent. For now, the joint statement stands as one of the broadest collective condemnations issued over a single incident in Gaza this month, and as a reminder that the ceasefire's credibility is being tested as much in hospitals and tent camps as at negotiating tables. Joint statements of this size are usually negotiated over days, and the breadth of the signatory list, spanning the Gulf, North Africa, Africa and Asia, was itself part of the message. Sudan's presence among the signatories links the statement to a country facing its own

severe humanitarian emergency, a point not lost on diplomats who work on both files. Humanitarian organisations have repeatedly argued that shelter materials are as life-saving in winter as food and medicine, because exposure in damaged tents can kill the very young and the very old.

The legal protection of hospitals is not a technicality invented for this conflict. It rests on the principle that the wounded and sick must be collected and cared for, and that those who treat them must be able to work without being targeted. When that protection is seen to fail, medical staff elsewhere in the war zone draw their own conclusions about whether to stay at their posts, and patients decide whether a hospital is safer than a damaged home. The eighteen ministers who signed the statement were therefore defending a rule their own countries rely on in wartime, as well as protesting one strike, and their text should be read in both of those registers by governments deciding how to respond.

(Source: UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Gaza and the Gulf · Latest Developments —

Drone Strike Kills Two in Gaza as Tankers Catch Fire After Striking Mines Near Hormuz

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Associated Press



Refugee assistance (Photo: UNHCR, CC BY 2.0, via Openverse)

An Israeli drone strike killed two Palestinians in the Gaza Strip on Saturday 14 November, hospital officials said, in a report carried by the Associated Press that also recorded the latest attack on shipping around the Strait of Hormuz. The drone struck two Palestinians walking down a street in Jabaliya, on the northern edge of Gaza City, according to Mohamed Abu Selmiya, director of Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, where the casualties were taken. The report placed the strike in a grim wider context: near-daily Israeli fire and airstrikes have continued in Gaza more than a year after Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire deal, and at least sixteen hundred Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire, according to Gaza's Health Ministry.

The same round-up of Middle East developments reported that Iranian state television said three oil tankers struck Iranian naval mines and caught fire around the Strait of Hormuz, citing statements from the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard and the Iranian Navy. The tanker incident is the latest in a series of attacks on shipping moving through the Persian Gulf, and it lands on a waterway already operating far below its normal capacity. Taken together, the two halves of the Associated Press report, a fatal strike in northern Gaza and burning tankers at the Gulf's entrance, capture a region in which ceasefires and shipping lanes alike remain under daily strain.

Jabaliya, where the two men were killed, is a densely built area in northern Gaza that has seen repeated fighting and displacement. Hospital directors such as Abu Selmiya have become regular sources for casualty information because their facilities receive the dead and wounded and keep the records that journalists and investigators later rely on. That reliance also underlines a wider problem: in a territory where access for outside reporters is limited, much of what the world knows about individual strikes comes from medical officials, civil defence teams and residents, whose accounts are then weighed by international agencies and news organisations against statements from the parties to the conflict.

The Hormuz tanker fires carry consequences well beyond the Gulf. The strait is the principal export route for several of the world's largest oil and gas producers, and every incident there raises insurance costs, delays cargoes and unsettles markets that set prices paid by consumers on other continents. Reports earlier in the week described transits running far below pre-conflict levels, with October recording the most incidents since the regional war began in February. Mines are a particularly feared hazard because they are indiscriminate, difficult to clear quickly, and capable of closing a channel even when only a small number are present. Shipping companies must now decide, voyage by voyage, how much risk their crews should bear.

For Gaza, the Jabaliya strike adds to a pattern that humanitarian officials say is eroding confidence in the ceasefire. A ceasefire that still produces regular fatalities is difficult for residents to distinguish from the war it was meant to end, and each new incident becomes evidence in a political argument about whether the agreement is being honoured. The figure cited by Gaza's Health Ministry, at least sixteen hundred killed since the ceasefire, will be contested like many wartime statistics, but the direction of the reporting is consistent across sources: violence has reduced from its peak, yet it has not stopped, and civilians continue to bear much of its cost.

Saturday's developments therefore point in two directions at once. In Gaza, the question is whether a ceasefire can be

made real in the streets of places like Jabaliya, where residents judge it by whether they can walk safely. At Hormuz, the question is whether the world's most important oil chokepoint can be kept open without further escalation between Iran, its neighbours and the United States. Neither question was answered on Saturday. What the day's reporting showed instead was how closely the two files are now connected: a region in which a drone strike in Gaza and a mine strike in the Gulf can appear in the same news dispatch, each raising the cost of the other. Maritime security analysts note that mine incidents are hard to attribute quickly, which is one reason official statements about them are phrased carefully and verified slowly. Northern Gaza's hospitals have operated through repeated shortages of fuel, staff and supplies, making each new casualty surge harder to absorb than the last. Energy markets reacted throughout the autumn to Hormuz incidents, a pattern traders say reflects how little spare shipping and production capacity the system currently holds.

Incidents at sea and strikes on land also interact through the region's alliances and deterrence calculations. Each side presents its actions as a response to the other's previous move, which is why ceasefire monitoring and clear attribution matter so much to mediators trying to stop a spiral. For ordinary people, those abstractions are invisible. A family in Jabaliya experiences the conflict as noise overhead and news from the hospital, while a tanker crew experiences it as orders, alarms and insurance forms. Reporting that keeps both experiences in view, as Saturday's dispatch did, gives readers a truer picture of a region where military, economic and humanitarian crises can no longer be separated into tidy separate stories.

(Source: Associated Press)

Ukraine · Peace Talks —

Ukraine, Russia and United States Talks in Abu Dhabi Move On to Moscow as Envoys Meet Putin

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Nexus Europa



Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Kyiv, Ukraine (Photo: Levchuk Volodymyr, CC BY 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Trilateral negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States concluded in Abu Dhabi in the days before 14 November, marking, according to Nexus Europa's 14 November round-up, the first direct diplomatic session among the parties since February 2026. The talks stalled over territorial issues, the round-up reported, while Russian strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure continued in parallel. United States negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff then travelled on to Moscow to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, with a further meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky planned in Dublin. The sequence, Abu Dhabi, then Moscow, then Dublin, shows a diplomatic process moving quickly between capitals even as its central disagreement remains unresolved.

The territorial question sits at the heart of that disagreement. Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky rejected potential territorial compromises, according to the round-up, while other reporting from the same days described proposals and counter-proposals about the Donbas region and Ukraine's future security arrangements. President Zelensky was reported by Italian and other European coverage to have said that United States negotiators had, for the first time, asked whether Ukraine would withdraw from parts of Donbas in return for NATO membership, and that a comprehensive security package was under discussion. Those accounts, attributed to the participants themselves, illustrate how fundamental the choices now on the table have become for Kyiv.

While diplomats talked, the war's pressure on Ukrainian civilians continued. The Nexus Europa round-up reported

that Russian forces targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure with nighttime strikes, deploying more than one hundred and sixty aerial targets and leaving hundreds of thousands of residents in the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions without electricity. A separate daily brief compiled from Ukrainian General Staff reporting recorded two hundred and seventy-three combat engagements over twenty-four hours and an overnight attack on 14 November involving ninety-six drones, of which eighty-one were reported shot down or suppressed. The juxtaposition is now familiar in this war: negotiation and bombardment proceeding at the same time, each shaping the leverage available in the other.

Europe's place in the process became a story in its own right during the same week. European leaders meeting in Dublin agreed that Europe should be represented in any future negotiations, a decision covered separately in this edition, and Ukrainian officials have argued that ending the war without European participation would be both unfair and impossible, given that the settlement will shape European security for a generation. The planned Dublin leg of the American envoys' tour, to brief and consult Zelensky after Moscow, reflects that reality. Whatever is discussed between Washington and Moscow will eventually require Ukrainian consent and European support if it is to hold.

The Abu Dhabi format itself is significant. The United Arab Emirates has hosted previous rounds of talks and prisoner-exchange diplomacy in this war, and reporting on the latest session noted broad agreement in principle on a large prisoner-of-war exchange as one concrete outcome, even where territory divided the sides. Prisoner exchanges matter beyond their numbers: they are often the first test of whether two governments that deny each other's legitimacy can still implement a written commitment. Families on both sides follow them closely, and mediators treat a successful exchange as evidence that channels remain open for harder questions.

What comes next is a test of whether momentum can survive contact with the territorial issue. The envoys' Moscow meeting with Putin, followed by consultations with Zelensky, sets up a sequence in which each side will be asked, in private, how much it is prepared to move. Public positions, Medinsky's rejection of territorial compromise on one side and Ukraine's insistence on its sovereignty on the other, leave little visible room between them. Yet the fact that direct trilateral talks have resumed at all, after a gap stretching back to February, marks a change from the diplomatic freeze of recent months. Readers should treat claims of breakthroughs cautiously until the parties themselves announce terms, but the machinery of negotiation is plainly moving again. Abu Dhabi has built a role as a discreet venue for contacts between adversaries, hosting exchanges and talks that neither side could easily hold in the other's capital. Energy infrastructure has been a recurring target as winter approaches, because damage to generation and transmission affects heating and water supplies as well as industry. Security guarantees, rather than territory alone, are expected by many analysts to decide whether any settlement endures, since Ukraine's central fear is a renewed invasion after a pause.

Prisoner exchanges and humanitarian pauses have historically been the areas where this war's adversaries found limited agreement first, precisely because they do not require either side to concede the questions of land and sovereignty that divide them. If the Abu Dhabi channel produces a large exchange, it will be welcomed by families and treated by diplomats as a down payment on trust that does not yet exist. If it produces nothing, the failure will reinforce the argument heard in European capitals this week: that the parties are manoeuvring for advantage ahead of a settlement neither yet believes is available, and that civilians, in Ukraine's power-starved regions above all, will pay for the delay through another winter of war.

(Source: Nexus Europa)

Yemen · United Nations —

Security Council Renews Yemen Sanctions to 2027 and Expands Maritime Monitoring Panel

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: The Tower Post



UN Security Council chamber (Photo: CTBTO, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

The United Nations Security Council has unanimously renewed its Yemen sanctions regime, extending targeted financial restrictions and travel bans until 14 November 2027, in a vote reported on 13 November by The Tower Post and in United Nations meeting coverage. The United Kingdom-backed resolution, numbered 2837, also keeps the Panel of Experts that monitors the sanctions in place until 15 December 2027 and asks the Secretary-General to expand it from four members to six, including dedicated maritime security expertise for the first time. The Council strongly

condemned the Houthis' military escalation and demanded an end to their attacks, as fighting continues to deepen humanitarian needs across Yemen.

The sanctions system being renewed has deep roots. It was established in 2014, with targeted asset freezes and travel bans applied to individuals and entities designated by the Council's Yemen Sanctions Committee, and a targeted arms embargo followed in 2015 under resolution 2216, which remains open-ended. Resolution 2837 therefore does not create a new regime; it extends and adjusts an existing one, preserving an international mechanism for scrutinising compliance while hostilities continue. The unanimity of the vote matters in that context, because sanctions renewals in a divided Council are not automatic, and a consensus text signals that members preferred a functioning regime to the signal that letting it lapse would have sent.

The most distinctive change is the attention paid to weapons supply chains. The Council urged countries to intensify efforts against the smuggling of weapons and components over land and by sea, with greater information sharing, and it expressed its intention to decide by 11 January 2027 on measures concerning specified dual-use components and precursor chemicals identified in an experts' report. In Britain's explanation of the vote, Ambassador Sarah MacIntosh linked the changes to the Houthis' use of such materials in domestic weapons manufacturing. That January deadline gives the renewal a forward agenda: the Council has told its own experts, and the states accused of supplying components, that a further decision is coming.

Negotiating that consensus was harder than the unanimous vote suggests. Reporting based on Security Council Report's analysis described Britain amending its draft five times in the face of objections from Russia and China, with wording describing the Houthis as a terrorist group removed from the final text and stronger provisions on components deferred to the January decision. Bahrain, backed by the United States, had sought stronger language in places. The episode is a useful reminder of how Council texts are made: the public resolution is the residue of private bargaining, and what is postponed, a label here, a components regime there, often matters as much as what is adopted.

The maritime element reflects where the Yemen conflict now touches the wider world. Houthi attacks on and threats against commercial shipping, and cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia, were condemned in the resolution, and the addition of maritime expertise to the experts' panel acknowledges that weapons and components increasingly move by sea. Separate reporting the same week described Houthi claims of attacks on a Saudi pipeline pumping station and the port of Yanbu, and Saudi-led forces intercepting drones, claims presented as claims by the sides that made them. With the Strait of Hormuz already largely closed by the Gulf crisis, pressure on Red Sea routes carries an outsized economic weight.

For Yemenis themselves, sanctions are background noise compared with the war's daily costs, and the renewal reporting noted that fighting continues to deepen humanitarian needs. The value of the regime, its supporters argue, lies in constraining the flow of weapons that prolongs the fighting and in maintaining an expert record of how those weapons move. Its critics, including Council members who resisted stronger wording, argue that labels and embargoes must not close off political settlement. Both arguments will return in January, when the Council must decide on dual-use components. Until then, resolution 2837 keeps the existing machinery running, larger, more maritime in focus, and explicitly on a clock. The Panel of Experts model is used in several UN sanctions regimes, with small investigative teams documenting violations and reporting to the committees that oversee designations. Yemen's war has produced one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises, a context that shapes how every Council decision on the country is received by aid agencies. Red Sea shipping disruption forces vessels onto longer routes around Africa, raising costs for trade between Europe, the Gulf and Asia.

Sanctions regimes are often judged years later, and usually by whether they changed the behaviour of those they targeted or merely documented disapproval. The Yemen regime's defenders point to the expert panel's reporting, which has built a public record of weapons flows that would otherwise remain deniable, and to the arms embargo's role in raising the cost and difficulty of resupply. Its critics note that the war has continued through a decade of designations. Resolution 2837 does not resolve that argument, but its maritime expansion and its January deadline on components show a Council trying to adapt an old instrument to a conflict whose supply lines now run through the sea as much as across deserts and borders.

(Source: The Tower Post)

Korean Peninsula · Nuclear Issue —

North Korea Rejects G7 Call for Denuclearisation and Says Nuclear Status Is Unchangeable

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Korea JoongAng Daily

North Korea has rejected the Group of Seven's renewed call for its complete denuclearisation, declaring that its determination to remain a nuclear-armed state is unchangeable and demanding that its constitutional nuclear status be respected. Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui strongly condemned and rejected what she described as the G7's malicious criticism of her country's constitutional right, according to a statement carried by the state-run Korean

Central News Agency and reported by the Korea JoongAng Daily. Her formulation was blunt: that possession of nuclear weapons is, in Pyongyang's judgement, the most powerful guarantee for ensuring its national sovereign rights, and that this judgement is immutable.

The G7 statement she was answering came from a meeting of foreign ministers in Paris. The ministers of the United States, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Canada condemned North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and reaffirmed their commitment to the country's complete denuclearisation in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Those resolutions ban Pyongyang from developing such weapons, which is why the legal framing matters to both sides: the G7 presents denuclearisation as an existing obligation, while North Korea presents its arsenal as a constitutional fact that outside powers have no standing to discuss, let alone to bargain away.

Choe's statement was not the only signal from Pyongyang that week. A senior ruling party official, Kim Jong-sik, issued a separate statement criticising the expansion of United States and allied naval forces in the Indo-Pacific, singling out nuclear-powered submarine projects developed under the AUKUS pact and exercises by the Quad grouping, and pledging the constant and accelerated development of North Korea's war deterrence capability. Earlier in the same period, Kim Yo-jong, the sister of leader Kim Jong-un, rejected a call from the UN Secretary-General to resume dialogue. Read together, the statements form a coordinated posture: no dialogue on the terms offered, no denuclearisation, and continued development of the forces the G7 wants removed.

The double-standard argument runs through Pyongyang's case. North Korean officials accuse the United States and its allies of condemning its weapons while members of the G7 themselves possess nuclear weapons, and Choe argued that the only way to guarantee peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is to respect North Korea's constitutional status rather than advocate a denuclearisation she described as impossible in theory and in practice. Western governments reject that equivalence, pointing to the Security Council resolutions and to North Korea's missile testing, but the argument is aimed at audiences beyond the G7, particularly in countries that resent what they see as selective enforcement of global rules.

For South Korea and Japan, the immediate concern is practical rather than philosophical. North Korea's programmes include ballistic missiles capable of reaching both countries and, on its own account, a growing and diversifying deterrent. Each rejection of dialogue narrows the options available to Seoul and Tokyo to diplomacy backed by deterrence of their own, including closer military cooperation with the United States, the very cooperation Pyongyang cites as justification for its buildup. That circular logic, buildup answered by alliance, alliance cited as proof of hostile intent, has driven the peninsula's security dilemma for years, and this week's exchange showed no sign of breaking it.

The exchange leaves the diplomatic map unchanged, which is itself the news. The G7 has restated a goal, complete denuclearisation under Security Council resolutions, that North Korea has now restated it will never accept, in language designed to close the subject. Mediators have in the past explored intermediate steps, such as freezes or caps, but neither side's public position this week pointed in that direction. For readers following the file, the significance of Choe's statement is its finality: by grounding the arsenal in the constitution and describing the position as immutable, Pyongyang is telling negotiators that any future talks would have to begin from acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea, a starting point the G7 has just said, again, that it refuses. North Korea wrote its nuclear status into its constitution, a step analysts read as intended to raise the political cost of any future concession. The G7 foreign ministers' meeting in Paris covered several files at once, and its statement also addressed support for Russia's war effort by third countries. South Korean media follow KCNA statements closely because they are often the first, and sometimes the only, authoritative statement of Pyongyang's position.

The peninsula's history warns against expecting rapid change from statements alone. Agreements reached in 2018 and 2019, including a summit declaration that spoke of complete denuclearisation, unravelled over the sequencing of sanctions relief and disarmament steps, and each failure has made the next negotiation harder to start. North Korea has since expanded and diversified its arsenal and written its status into law and constitution, while the United States and its allies have deepened the military cooperation Pyongyang protests against. Diplomats who work on the file privately describe the present period as one of position-keeping rather than negotiation. Choe's statement fits that description exactly, and its careful, legalistic language suggests it was written for the record, to be quoted back whenever the subject is raised again.

(Source: Korea JoongAng Daily)

Sudan · Humanitarian Crisis —

Misery Deepens in Sudan as Aid for Millions of Displaced People Falls Short

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: VidiaNews



Displaced families (Photo: USAID, public domain)

Sudan's humanitarian crisis is being made worse by cuts and shortfalls in international aid, according to reporting published on 14 November that drew on a joint warning from the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations refugee agency. The two agencies sounded the alarm that serious funding gaps have depleted supplies of emergency shelter and basic household goods intended for Sudan's displaced people. The United Nations says about fifteen point four million people who fled Sudan's war need emergency shelter and household items, and aid teams have appealed for more funding as winter and continued fighting press on families who have already lost their homes.

The scale of need in Sudan is difficult to overstate. VidiaNews, reporting the agencies' warning, put the number of people dependent on humanitarian aid at thirty-three point seven million, in a country where war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has continued for more than three and a half years. The UN's Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan requires two point nine billion dollars to provide life-saving aid to twenty point four million people, yet only about forty-seven per cent of that funding had been raised. Between forty thousand and two hundred and fifty thousand people are estimated to have been killed since the war began in 2023, a range whose width itself testifies to how hard the conflict is to document.

Shelter is the immediate focus of the latest appeal because it is where the funding gap becomes physically visible. Emergency shelter kits and household items, the tarpaulins, blankets, cooking sets and basic goods that allow a displaced family to survive outside its home, are finite stocks held in warehouses and pipelines. When money does not arrive, those stocks run down and are not replaced, and families arriving from newly contested areas find that the help earlier arrivals received is no longer available. The World Food Programme gave a parallel warning the same week: its new Executive Director, Luke Lindberg, said after his first field mission to Sudan that funding cuts had forced the agency to scale back from more than four million people assisted to just over three million, leaving an estimated nine hundred thousand vulnerable people without food assistance.

The WFP figures show what a funding cut means in practice. In August the agency was providing food assistance to more than four million people, including eight hundred and eighty thousand in areas at risk of famine. It now says it urgently needs five hundred and twenty million dollars to provide life-saving food and nutrition assistance to five point four million people through April 2027. Famine has become widespread in Sudan, according to UN reporting, and the areas at risk are precisely those where fighting makes delivery hardest and most expensive. Aid officials describe a compounding problem: as needs grow, insecurity raises the cost of reaching people, while donor budgets shrink, so each dollar buys less relief than it did a year ago.

Violence continues to generate new displacement even as the response contracts. The UN Human Rights Office has reported that drones claimed the lives of at least one thousand one hundred and twenty civilians in the first half of 2026 alone, and appeals from Sudanese and international groups in early November called for an end to attacks on civilians, markets, hospitals and water and electricity supplies. On 23 October, the United Kingdom and thirty-one other international partners issued a joint statement on the looming famine. Statements, however, do not fill warehouses. The agencies' message this week was directed at finance ministries as much as at foreign ministries: without money actually transferred, plans and pledges do not become shelter kits or food rations.

For South Sudanese readers, Sudan's emergency is not a foreign story. The war across the border has sent refugees and returnees into South Sudan, strained services in border states, and disrupted the oil transit arrangements on which both economies depend. A collapse of aid inside Sudan pushes more people to move, and many of them move south. The joint IOM and UNHCR warning therefore deserves attention in Juba as well as in donor capitals. Sudan remains, in the UN's description, the site of the world's largest humanitarian and displacement crisis. This week's reporting suggests that distinction is being maintained not only by the scale of the war, but by the widening gap between what the response requires and what the world has so far provided. South Sudan hosts large numbers of people fleeing Sudan's war, adding pressure to its own fragile services and to aid operations based in Juba. Humanitarian appeals are typically

funded unevenly, with food and shelter often competing for the same donor budgets in the final quarter of the year. Agencies warn that depleted shelter stocks are hardest to rebuild quickly, because kits must be procured and transported into areas where roads and security are unreliable.

(Source: VidiaNews)

POLITICS

Europe · Dublin Summit —

European Leaders Agree E5 Plus EU Institutions Will Speak for Europe in Ukraine Peace Talks

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: European Council

European leaders meeting informally in Dublin on Friday 13 November agreed who will represent Europe in future peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, ending months of discussion about whether the continent would speak through one envoy or many. European Council President António Costa told the closing press conference that the European team for the negotiations will consist of the European Union institutions and the E5 countries of the coalition of the willing: France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom. His remarks were published in full by the European Council the same day, giving the decision an authoritative public record rather than leaving it to second-hand summit reporting.

Costa framed the choice in terms of security as much as diplomacy. Europe's security begins with Ukraine's security, he said, describing the leaders' position as clear, and he added that the weeks ahead will be a decisive test of Russia's readiness to bring the war to an end. The leaders also agreed to return to the question of Ukraine's financing needs for next year and beyond at the European Council on 26 and 27 November, building on forthcoming European Commission proposals. Reporting on the Dublin meetings put the scale of those needs at roughly seventy billion euros for 2027, a figure that explains why the representation question and the money question were discussed in the same room.

The Dublin gathering was larger than a normal European Union meeting. Nearly fifty heads of state and government attended two consecutive summits in the Irish capital, the first day devoted to the European Political Community and the second to an informal meeting of the EU's twenty-seven leaders, hosted by Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin alongside Costa. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attended, as did French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, according to summit coverage. On the evening of 12 November, American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner arrived in Dublin and briefed Zelensky on Russia's position after talks in Abu Dhabi and Moscow.

The search for a single European voice had exposed real differences. Summit analysis noted that Italian Prime Minister Meloni had criticised the EU's fragmented approach as all over the place, and that France and Germany were reluctant to accept an arrangement that would cost them their own seats at the table, while a narrower E3 format of France, Germany and Britain would have left out Italy and Poland. The eventual answer, a team rather than a person, reflects that argument. It gives the largest coalition-of-the-willing states a seat, keeps the EU institutions formally inside the process, and avoids the politically impossible task of choosing one European over all the others.

Artificial intelligence shared the Dublin agenda with the war. Costa noted that the leaders held their first in-depth discussion on AI, hearing from Mistral chief executive Arthur Mensch and Nobel laureate Geoffrey Hinton, and recalled that the European Union is the first region in the world with an AI governance framework. The Council will return to the topic at Alden Biesen on 5 February 2027. The pairing of subjects was not accidental: European governments increasingly treat technological capacity, defence and economic competitiveness as parts of a single strategic question, namely whether the continent can act at scale in a world shaped by larger powers.

For Ukraine, the practical meaning of the Dublin decision is that there is now a defined European counterpart for the American-led process that ran through Abu Dhabi and Moscow this week. Whether Russia will negotiate with that team remains an open question, and Costa himself identified Russian readiness as the outstanding condition. European officials also warned, in remarks reported from the summit, against allowing a debate about Europe's wider security architecture to become a distraction from ending the invasion itself. The next fixed point is the 26 and 27 November European Council, where financing decisions deferred in Dublin will have to be faced. Until then, Europe has at least settled who sits in its chairs when the talks begin. The coalition of the willing format grew out of meetings earlier in the war at which states supporting Ukraine coordinated military and financial assistance outside the EU's formal structures. Ireland's hosting of the largest diplomatic event in its history was widely noted in coverage of the summit, which brought leaders to Dublin on consecutive days. Financing for Ukraine has repeatedly tested EU unity, because it requires member states to agree contributions at a time of tight national budgets.

The representation decision also carries a lesson about how Europe now organises itself in a crisis. Rather than forcing a choice between the Union's institutions and its largest member states, Dublin combined them, accepting a larger team as the price of unity. That pattern, coalitions of willing states working alongside EU structures, has appeared in defence procurement, in military training for Ukraine and now in diplomacy. Critics call it untidy and warn that it blurs accountability. Supporters answer that in a continent of twenty-seven democracies, a team that everyone accepts is worth more than an envoy half the continent resents, and that the test of the Dublin formula will be whether it can deliver a common position quickly when negotiations become concrete.

(Source: European Council)

Climate Talks · COP31, Antalya —

UN Climate Chief Urges Speed as COP31 Confronts Fossil Fuel Divide in Final Week

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Reuters



Electricity transmission tower (Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

The United Nations' top climate official urged negotiators at the COP31 conference in Turkey on Saturday 14 November to move swiftly towards a deal and avoid tactical delays as the summit heads into its second and final week. Simon Stiell, executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, told the summit in Antalya that as the talks enter their second week he urged parties to move swiftly to the hardest issues. Reuters reported that big fossil fuel producers and consumers at the talks are resisting any deal that would specify firm new targets or a shift away from oil, gas and coal, posing a challenge for host Turkey and lead negotiator Australia to land the ambitious agreement climate advocates say is needed.

The conference, running from 9 to 20 November, faces new challenges this year as a slew of crises, from war to inflation, push global warming down the list of priorities for world governments, Reuters noted. A UN report last month found the world is already on course to exceed the one point five degrees Celsius warming threshold, the limit scientists say should prevent the worst effects of climate change. That finding hangs over the negotiating rooms: the argument in Antalya is no longer about preventing overshoot of the Paris goal in the abstract, but about how far beyond it the world will go, how quickly emissions can be brought down afterwards, and who pays for the damage already arriving.

Turkey, as host, is striving to place a proposal to expand global electrification at the centre of an eventual deal, arguing the plan will lead to faster emissions cuts by speeding the shift away from fossil fuel-powered cars, boilers, furnaces and other equipment. Electrification has become a favoured theme for negotiators looking for common ground, because it promises emissions reductions through technologies, electric vehicles, heat pumps and clean power, that are already spreading commercially. Australia's Chris Bowen, who leads the negotiations, was expected to produce an initial draft of the agreement text early in the coming week, according to reporting from the summit, and the presidency released a summary of reflections on Friday listing options for the outcome, including advancing the transition away from fossil fuels and recognising the role of forests and oceans.

One absence shapes the talks as much as any presence. The world's biggest oil consumer, the United States, has skipped the talks for the second year in a row under President Donald Trump, Reuters reported. American absence changes the arithmetic of climate finance and of pressure on other large producers, and it leaves European, Chinese and developing-country negotiators to construct a deal without the country whose emissions and money have historically anchored such agreements. Campaign groups were blunt about the pace: Greenpeace Australia Pacific said at the midway point that vital work was still needed to deliver real progress on phasing out fossil fuels, protecting the one point five degree goal and massively scaling up climate finance, and warned that options listed in the presidency's summary are not yet agreed commitments and must be strengthened, not diluted.

For African delegations, the Antalya argument is about more than fossil fuel wording. The continent contributes least to global emissions yet faces severe exposure to drought, flood and heat, and its negotiators typically press two linked demands: faster emissions cuts by the largest polluters, and finance on a scale that allows adaptation and a development path that does not repeat the carbon-heavy route taken by richer states. South Sudan, where flooding has repeatedly displaced communities and where energy access remains among the lowest in the world, sits at the sharp end of both questions. Electrification, the summit's favoured theme,

means something concrete in such a context: whether clean power reaches towns and villages that currently have almost none.

The coming week will decide whether COP31 produces a text with firm commitments or another statement of direction. Stiell's plea against tactical delays was aimed at a familiar summit pattern, in which the hardest questions are deferred until the final night and then settled in exhaustion or not at all. With a draft expected early in the week, negotiators will soon have language to fight over line by line. What they agree by 20 November will be judged against the UN's own warning that the one point five degree threshold is already being crossed. For the governments that sent them, and for the communities watching from flood plains and drought zones far from Antalya, that judgement, not the communiqué's length, is what will count. COP conferences operate by consensus, which gives determined minorities significant power to soften or block language they oppose. The Paris Agreement's global stocktake process is designed to ratchet national pledges upward over time, and the 2028 summit is due to hold the second such review. Climate finance, money from richer to poorer countries for cuts and adaptation, has been the most persistent source of disagreement across successive summits.

(Source: Reuters)

ECONOMY

United States · Financial Stability —

AI Rockets to Top of Financial Stability Worries in Latest Federal Reserve Survey

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Reuters

Risks tied to the artificial intelligence sector have surged to become the top-cited concern for financial stability in the United States, according to a semi-annual report released by the Federal Reserve on Friday 13 November and reported by Reuters. Eighty-seven per cent of the market contacts surveyed cited AI as a salient risk to the financial system, up sharply from fifty per cent in the May version of the survey. Respondents pointed to worries about cyberattacks, risks associated with complex forms of AI-related financing, and the possibility of an AI earnings slowdown sparking a broad market correction. The second most-cited concern, a broad correction in risk assets, was named by fifty-two per cent, and cyberattacks specifically by forty-three per cent.

The survey, conducted by staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York among twenty-three contacts at broker-dealers, banks, investment funds and advisory firms in September and October, measures what the people who move money worry about most over the coming twelve to eighteen months. The Fed is careful to note that the survey summarises respondents' views rather than the central bank's own judgement. Even so, the jump from fifty to eighty-seven per cent in six months is striking, and the report's own analysis gave the concern substance: debt issuance tied to advanced computing had surged to six hundred and eighty billion dollars by October 2026, already a fivefold increase on the debt issued in all of 2023.

That borrowing figure is the heart of the story. The AI boom is being built with borrowed money on a vast scale: data centres, power connections, chips and the buildings that house them, financed through bonds, loans, leases and guarantees. Further analysis of the report put outstanding public debt tied to advanced computing at more than one point one trillion dollars, and noted that large technology firms' not-yet-commenced leases exceed one trillion dollars while their guarantees and contract commitments exceed two trillion, meaning their true exposure to a downturn may be substantially larger than their balance sheets show. When an industry's expansion rests on that much credit, a disappointment in earnings becomes a problem for lenders as well as shareholders.

Respondents described three distinct channels of risk. The first is valuation: AI-related shares have risen so far that an earnings slowdown could trigger a broad correction in risk assets, the second-ranked concern in the same survey. The second is cyber risk, including attacks by state actors and damage that powerful AI models themselves might cause or enable. The third is the financing structure itself, complex arrangements that spread data-centre debt through funds, insurers and other corners of the financial system where it is harder to see. The survey was conducted in September and October, before the latest turmoil at chipmaker Nvidia, where chief executive Jensen Huang stepped down on Thursday, an event Reuters noted when reporting the survey's release.

For an African newspaper, a Wall Street anxiety survey might seem distant, but the transmission channels are real. A sharp correction in United States technology shares would tighten global financial conditions, raise the cost of borrowing for governments and companies in emerging markets, and reduce the risk appetite of the funds that buy African sovereign debt. South Sudan and its neighbours borrow, trade and receive remittances in a system priced in dollars and steered by American interest rates and sentiment. The Fed report also sits alongside warnings from the International Monetary Fund about stretched AI valuations, suggesting that concern about a technology bubble is now shared by the world's principal financial watchdogs.

The report is not a prediction of a crash, and readers should not treat it as one. A survey of twenty-three contacts is a measure of sentiment, and sentiment at the top of a boom often looks alarming in hindsight whether or not a crisis

follows. What the November report establishes is narrower and still important: the professionals the Fed consults now regard AI, its valuations, its debts and its cyber risks, as the single most salient threat to financial stability, ahead of interest rates, government debt and energy prices. Regulators will respond by looking harder at data-centre leverage and at who ultimately holds the risk. Investors, in the United States and far beyond it, have been put on notice by their own central bank's scoreboard. The Financial Stability Report is published twice a year and is one of the main ways the Federal Reserve communicates systemic concerns without changing interest-rate policy. Data-centre construction has become a significant share of investment-grade corporate borrowing, a shift the report documents in detail. Emerging-market finance ministries watch such reports because US financial conditions set the tone for global borrowing costs.

The Fed's findings also raise a question that reaches into pension funds and insurance companies far from Silicon Valley. As data-centre debt has been packaged, lent and invested through many channels, the ultimate holders of the risk include ordinary savers whose funds bought the bonds or financed the lenders. That dispersal is precisely what financial stability reports exist to examine, because risk that is widely spread can be safer than risk concentrated in one place, until a common shock reveals that everyone was exposed to the same asset at once. The November report does not say that such a shock is coming. It says, with unusual clarity, that the people paid to worry about the system now worry about this first.

(Source: Reuters)

Pakistan · IMF Programme —

IMF Renews Call for Pakistan to Phase Out Fuel Subsidies Quickly

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: International Monetary Fund



Electricity transmission tower (Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

The International Monetary Fund has renewed its recommendation that Pakistan quickly phase out its fuel subsidy programme, saying the scheme's cost is high and its targeting is broad, in a position reaffirmed by a Fund spokesperson on 14 November. The Fund called for any future assistance, if oil prices rise unexpectedly, to be limited, temporary and targeted through existing social assistance programmes, and to remain within the fiscal year 2027 budget ceiling. The recommendation places a swift end to the current programme at the centre of the Fund's position on subsidies, while leaving a narrow door open for emergency help that is deliberately designed not to become permanent.

The programme in question was approved by Pakistan's Economic Coordination Committee on 14 September, with a supplementary grant of seventy-five billion rupees. Fuel subsidies of this kind are politically attractive because they are visible at every petrol pump, but they are expensive in a particular way: because they lower the price for everyone, much of their benefit flows to larger consumers who use more fuel, rather than to the poor households governments usually say they want to protect. That is the targeting problem the Fund cited. Its alternative, channelling help through existing social assistance programmes, is intended to concentrate scarce money on those least able to absorb price rises.

The recommendation is tied to a broader fiscal framework. Pakistan's fiscal year 2027 budget, the Fund said, is based on a targeted primary surplus of two per cent of gross domestic product, a goal that leaves little room for an open-ended subsidy bill. The position was set out in a statement published on 7 October, when the IMF announced a staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Pakistan's Extended Fund Facility and the third review of its Resilience and Sustainability Facility, and it was reaffirmed on 14 November. Programme reviews of this kind are the mechanism by which IMF lending continues: each completed review confirms that the borrower is meeting the conditions attached to its support.

The economic backdrop makes the argument harder for Pakistan's government, not easier. The Bureau of Statistics recorded a twenty-eight point six one per cent year-on-year rise in the transport group in October, while prices in the housing, water, electricity, gas and fuel group rose eleven point zero three per cent. In an October assessment, the IMF said headline inflation had fallen to around ten point three per cent in September after peaking in May, with core inflation remaining under control, and it recorded real GDP growth of four per cent in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, estimating full-year growth at three point six per cent. Removing a fuel subsidy into that price environment risks pushing transport and energy costs up again, which is why the politics of the Fund's advice are so sensitive.

The Fund's risk assessment for Pakistan will sound familiar to finance ministries across the developing world. It listed geopolitical tensions, volatile energy prices, tighter global financial conditions and trade disruptions, and described the Middle East war as a major headwind for Pakistan's economy, warning that continued price volatility could weigh on the outlook. With the Strait of Hormuz largely closed and oil markets unsettled, an importing country that subsidises fuel is exposed twice over: it pays more for each cargo, and then pays again at the pump to shield consumers. The Fund did not link ending subsidies to containing inflation; its case rested on cost, targeting and the budget ceiling.

Pakistan's dilemma is one many governments, including African oil importers and exporters alike, will recognise. Subsidies are easy to start, painful to remove, and corrosive to budgets while they last, yet their removal lands hardest on transport workers, farmers and poor households unless a credible alternative is ready. The Fund's formula, end the general subsidy quickly, keep only limited, temporary and targeted help, and hold it inside the budget ceiling, is an attempt to square that circle on paper. Whether Islamabad accepts the timetable, and whether its social assistance systems can actually deliver the targeted alternative at scale, will be tested in the next programme discussions. For now, the Fund has made its position public twice in five weeks, which in IMF language is a clear signal that it expects movement. Extended Fund Facility arrangements are the IMF's main tool for countries facing medium-term balance-of-payments problems, and reviews under them are published as they are completed. Targeted cash-transfer systems are the Fund's usual prescription in place of price subsidies, because they can be aimed at registered low-income households. Energy price volatility linked to the Gulf crisis has complicated subsidy reform in several importing countries this year, not only in Pakistan.

The case also illustrates the Fund's evolving doctrine on subsidies, which has shifted over two decades from simply opposing them to insisting that reform protect the poorest through cash support rather than cheap fuel for all. Governments that have followed that path successfully usually moved when a credible payment system already existed and when the public believed the savings would be visibly spent elsewhere. Where trust is low, subsidy removal is read as a tax on the poor imposed at a foreign institution's request, which is why the politics in Islamabad will matter as much as the arithmetic. The Fund's reaffirmation, delivered through a spokesperson rather than a new negotiation, suggests it wants the October commitment carried out.

(Source: International Monetary Fund)

TRADE AND SHIPPING —

China–Africa Container Rates Stay More Than Double Last Year's Levels as November Surcharges Bite

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Dantful International Logistics

Importers moving goods from China to Africa are still paying crisis-era prices, according to a November 2026 cost guide published by Dantful International Logistics, drawing on spot quotes for sailings in the first half of the month. Drewry's World Container Index stood at 4,305 dollars per forty-foot container on 12 November, down two percent week on week but still 132 percent higher than a year earlier. Africa is not one of the index's lanes, so that number is context rather than a quote, but the African gateways in the guide tell the same story in their own figures.

The East African numbers are the ones that matter most to this region's traders. Published spot quotes for Shanghai to Dar es Salaam ranged from 5,200 to 6,514 dollars for a forty-foot or high-cube container, and from 3,210 to 4,341 dollars for a twenty-foot unit, across carriers including ZIM, MSC, CMA CGM and Maersk, with port-to-port transit of twenty to thirty-seven days. Mombasa, the gateway for Kenya and much of landlocked East Africa, was quoted at 2,900 to 4,700 dollars for a twenty-foot container and roughly 4,200 to 6,500 dollars for forty-foot equipment, at twenty to thirty-two days.

On top of base freight, surcharges keep arriving. From 1 November, CMA CGM applied 300 dollars per twenty-foot equivalent unit from China to South Africa, Madagascar, Mozambique and Mauritius. The guide's central warning is definitional: a container shipping cost can mean at least four different products, port-to-port ocean freight, port-to-door, delivered-duty-paid door-to-door, or a forwarder's all-in consolidation rate. The bands it publishes are ocean freight plus origin charges unless stated otherwise, and every figure carries a month and a source, because a rate quoted without a date is, it argues, the most common way importers get hurt.

That warning is worth underlining for the small and mid-sized traders who dominate much of China–Africa commerce. A headline rate that excludes terminal handling, surcharges, duty and value-added tax is not a landed cost, and the gap between the two decides whether a consignment of electronics, textiles or machinery makes a profit in Dar es Salaam or Mombasa. Kenya's import charges alone, as listed in the guide's country notes, include an import declaration fee and a railway development levy alongside sixteen percent VAT. Traders who price their goods off the ocean band alone discover the rest at the port.

Dar es Salaam's role explains why its rates command attention beyond Tanzania. The port remains a vital gateway for landlocked East African countries including Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, just as Mombasa serves Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan. When forty-foot rates to Dar es Salaam sit above five thousand dollars before surcharges, the cost travels inland with the container, into the shelf prices of imported goods in Kampala and Kigali and into the margins of every wholesaler along the corridor. Freight inflation, on these lanes, is a regional tax that nobody voted for.

The comparison with the great east–west lanes puts Africa's position in perspective. The same Drewry index put Shanghai to Los Angeles at 7,416 dollars and Shanghai to New York at 9,020 dollars per forty-foot container in the week to 12 November. African importers are not paying the world's highest rates, but they are paying historically elevated ones on thinner routes with fewer sailings, less competition and longer exposure to surcharge announcements. A two percent weekly fall in the global index is welcome; a level still 132 percent above last year is the number that shapes a trading season.

There is also a timing problem that rates alone do not capture. Twenty to thirty-seven days port to port to Dar es Salaam, and twenty to thirty-two to Mombasa, are the sea legs only. Congestion, documentation and inland haulage add their own days, and each added day is stock a trader has paid for but cannot sell. In a high-rate environment, businesses respond rationally and painfully: smaller orders, narrower ranges, less stock held against shortages. Shelves empty faster, and the consumer meets the shipping market as absence as well as price.

For East African policymakers, the guide's figures feed a familiar debate. Port efficiency, corridor reliability and regional competition between Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are among the few levers governments actually control, since none of them sets the global container market. Every shilling saved in port charges and dwell time is a shilling that does not depend on Drewry's index falling. The November data, with global rates easing only slightly from extraordinary levels, strengthen the case for treating corridor costs as trade policy, not administration.

What should a trader do with all this in the second half of November? The guide's own discipline is the practical answer: date every quote, source every figure, separate ocean freight from the duty and tax stack, and compare like with like across carriers and forwarders before committing. Rates may drift down from here, as this week's index did, but nobody importing into East Africa this month can budget on the assumption that last year's prices are coming back soon. The market has reset, and the region's trade is learning to live at the new level.

(Source: Dantful International Logistics)

REGIONAL INTEGRATION —

Rail and Road Corridors Put Mombasa at the Centre of East Africa's Expanding Trade Map

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Africa Business Pages



Juba, South Sudan (Photo: Zamwan, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

East Africa's trade is being reorganised around its corridors, and two pieces of reporting this week, very different in kind, point at the same map. A regional business survey published on 13 November described a new standard gauge railway network linking Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan as set to transform trade and logistics among East African nations, as part of the broader Northern Corridor integration projects. Industry reporting published on 15 November described Kenya's expanding transport sector driving demand for modern trucks and trailers, as logistics corridors, port expansion and regional trade routes move more freight across the region.

The railway proposal is the grander of the two stories. The survey described the link as the first stable, high-capacity connection between landlocked South Sudan and its coastal neighbours, establishing a transit corridor from the Indian Ocean into the African hinterland. From the ports of Mombasa and Lamu, goods could move onward to Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Tanzania, and South Sudan could export oil and agricultural products more efficiently. For a country whose trade currently depends on long, expensive road hauls, a working rail link would be an economic event of the first order.

Uganda's stake is just as concrete. The survey noted that Uganda's biggest economic handicap has historically been the high cost of freight between Kampala and Mombasa, the nearest ocean port. The Port of Mombasa currently handles over eighty percent of Uganda's and Rwanda's maritime trade, making it the lifeline of landlocked East Africa. Anything that cheapens or speeds the Mombasa to Kampala leg, rail above all, goes straight into the price of fuel, food

and building materials across the interior. Corridor economics are household economics, one step removed.

The truck story is the same map read at ground level. Industry reporting described Kenya as the primary maritime gateway for several landlocked economies, with cargo arriving at Mombasa redistributed by road toward Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan and parts of Congo. It listed the corridors plainly: Mombasa to Nairobi to Kampala, the busiest freight route in the region; routes onward to Rwanda and Burundi; the Mombasa to Juba corridor carrying fuel, construction materials and aid cargo into South Sudan; and cross-border movement toward Great Lakes markets. Dar es Salaam anchors the alternative Central Corridor through Dodoma to Kigali and Burundi.

That ground-level demand is why hauliers are investing. The reporting linked Kenya's position to its standard gauge railway between Mombasa and Nairobi, the Northern Corridor road route, and highway expansion toward Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan, all increasing freight movement. Growing volumes on harsh, long-distance routes raise demand for lowbeds, flatbeds, tankers and heavy-duty equipment that can survive them. Freight demand in Kenya is forecast to expand steadily through the rest of the decade, the report said, which is another way of saying the region expects to keep trading more, not less.

The two stories belong together because rail and road are not rivals on this map so much as successive answers to the same question. Rail, where it is built and run well, takes bulk and distance at a cost roads cannot match. Roads reach everywhere rail does not, including the last several hundred kilometres into Juba. The Lamu Port and LAPSSET corridor project, linking a new port to South Sudan and Ethiopia, adds a second coastal option that could, over time, rebalance a system in which one port carries four-fifths of two countries' sea trade.

Regional policy is trying to widen the same opening. The business survey placed the corridor build-out alongside the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area and special economic zones along the rail corridors in Kenya and Uganda, attracting investment in agro-processing, textiles and vehicle assembly. The logic is that corridors should carry finished goods traded tariff-free between African countries, not only imports arriving from overseas. A railway that only speeds imports inland is a logistics project. A railway that lets Ugandan or South Sudanese producers reach a coast competitively is an industrial strategy.

None of this is quick, and the honest reader should hold the two timescales apart. Trucks are being bought now, for corridors that exist now, at freight volumes measurable now. The trilateral railway is a proposed network within a set of integration projects whose history includes long delays, and its benefits for Juba in particular remain prospective. Treating a proposal as a fact would repeat the region's oldest infrastructure mistake. Treating it as irrelevant would be the second oldest. The direction of travel, in both reports, is consistent even where the dates are not.

For South Sudan, the corridor question is existential in a way it is not for coastal Kenya. Every litre of fuel and bag of cement in Juba has paid for its journey from a foreign port, and every future export beyond oil, agricultural produce above all, must make the same journey in reverse at a price that leaves the farmer a margin. Whether the answer arrives by rail, by better roads, or by both in sequence, this week's reporting describes a region building toward the same conclusion: the interior's prosperity will be decided as much on its corridors as in its fields and oilfields.

(Source: Africa Business Pages)

WEEK IN REVIEW

SUNDAY ANALYSIS —

The Road to Elections: A Week That Opened Registration and Moved the Finish Line

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Reuters / UN News — week in review



President Salva Kiir (Photo: USAID, public domain)

This is an analysis piece, reviewing a week of verified reporting in this newspaper's editions of 12 to 14 November. South Sudan's road to its first national elections took two large steps in opposite directions at once: the machinery of a real election visibly started, and the date of the election itself moved. On Friday, the National Electoral Commission announced that voter registration would run from 14 to 28 November across 3,161 centres in the ten states and three administrative areas. On Saturday, registration duly opened. On the same day, the Commission announced that polling, set for 22 December, would move to 11 February 2027.

To understand the week, start with what did not change. Registration, the foundation exercise on which everything else rests, went ahead on schedule, with materials reported to

have reached state capitals and a preliminary register to follow. Campaigning is now expected to run from 27 December to 9 February, with results in mid-February. The postponement, as the Commission's spokeswoman put it in one account, was presented not as a cancellation but as an adjustment to allow other processes to be implemented, in accordance with the law.

The week's earlier editions show why scepticism was already loaded and waiting. On 12 November, this newspaper reported the United Nations Security Council being told that the election countdown must stay anchored in the peace agreement, and an opposition party, the USSP, telling the Elections Commission the vote was not ready while asking President Kiir to lift movement restrictions. On 13 November, the readiness debate deepened in Council reporting that warned the vote must not deepen division, alongside a briefing warning that the women's quota had been missed and communal violence was rising. The February date did not land on a calm surface. It landed on a documented argument.

That argument has two honest sides, and a Sunday analysis should give both their weight. The case for moving is practical: registration materials still moving from capitals to centres, civic education still to be done, institutions still incomplete, and a UN Commission warning in September that the country lacked adequate safeguards for peaceful and credible elections. A rushed, badly prepared first election can damage the very legitimacy it is meant to create. The case against is historical: this is the third major postponement, after votes planned for 2022 and December 2024, in a country independent since July 2011 that has never held a national election. Each delay spends public trust that the transition has not yet earned back.

The human week behind the headlines deserves its place in any review. The nation buried General Joseph Lagu, whose body lay in state at Parliament on 12 November and whose state burial was held in Juba on 13 November, with the Machar court adjourning for the funeral. A founding figure's farewell, in the middle of an election countdown, was a reminder that the generation which fought for the state is passing while the state's first democratic test is still being scheduled.

Security, the variable on which everything else depends, intruded as it always does. This newspaper reported on 14 November that veteran journalist Veronica Lucy Gordon was killed in a road ambush in Mundri, in a vehicle carrying SPLM delegates returning from primaries, and on 12 November that weeks of clashes in Ruweng had killed 23 people and driven more than 100,000 from their homes. An election is not only a timetable. It is thousands of local journeys, meetings and queues, each requiring a basic level of safety that parts of the country cannot yet guarantee. Any honest assessment of February's feasibility starts there.

Politics, meanwhile, did not pause for the timetable. The SPLM's primaries committee kicked off in Juba on 13 November as parties raced the election calendar, and the trial of Riek Machar, under house arrest since March 2025 and facing charges he denies, continued its adjournments at Freedom Hall. A first election held while the principal opposition figure is detained and on trial will be judged, at home and abroad, on its inclusiveness as much as its logistics. The week's reporting offers no resolution to that tension, because the country has not resolved it either.

What, then, did the week actually decide? It decided that registration is real, that December is not happening, and that February is now the date against which every actor will be measured. The shorter delay, seven weeks rather than the years of previous postponements, cuts both ways: it is close enough to keep preparations honest, and close enough that another move would be very hard to explain. The Commission has used its credibility to buy a specific, limited amount of time. How it spends the registration fortnight now under way will say more than any announcement.

For voters, the practical conclusion is unchanged and worth repeating on a Sunday: register. Registration from 14 to 28 November is the one part of the process already in citizens' hands, valid under either date, and the strongest answer available to a week of moving timetables. Governments and commissions set polling days. Electorates are built, name by name, at 3,161 centres, by people who show up. This week's analysis ends where the week's reporting began: the road to elections is longer than promised, but for the first time it has voters walking on it.

(Source: Reuters / UN News — week in review)

SUNDAY ANALYSIS —

Sudan's War Spills Over Every Border: A Week of Drones, Consulates and Empty Warehouses

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Al Jazeera / UN News — week in review



Humanitarian aid delivery in Sudan (Photo: FCDO, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

This is an analysis piece, reviewing a week of verified reporting in this newspaper's editions of 12 to 14 November. Sudan's war, now in its fourth year since April 2023, spent the week demonstrating that it no longer fits inside Sudan. Its drones crossed borders, its diplomacy expelled diplomats, its armies traded strongholds in Kordofan, and its hunger set records that humanitarian agencies recited with the flat tone of people running out of adjectives. More than fourteen million people have been displaced by the war, a figure this newspaper carried again on Friday, and the week's events explained why that number keeps growing.

Begin with the borders, because the war did. On 13 November, this newspaper reported that Sudan had closed Ethiopia's consulate near the border and expelled diplomats hours after Addis Ababa expelled six Sudanese diplomats and shut Khartoum's consulate. Behind the tit-for-tat stood a graver accusation: Sudan's complaints to the United Nations and African Union accused Ethiopia of allowing the Rapid Support Forces to launch drones from its territory, while Ethiopia accused Sudan of backing Tigray rebels. Both denied the charges. Drone strikes on substations at al-Dabba and Abu Hamad had knocked out power days earlier.

The battlefield reporting told a matching story of movement without decision. Sudan's army said on 13 November that it had captured al-Mazroub in North Kordofan, described by an army source as the RSF's largest stronghold in the state, in fierce battles with RSF casualties and vehicle losses. A Special Forces spokesman said the position links North and West Kordofan and cuts RSF supply lines. On 14 November, army gains around al-Khuwai in West Kordofan were reported to have broken the siege pressure on Al-Obeid. Kordofan, analysts note, has been a main battleground since late 2025, accounting for one in five recorded attacks in Sudan since April 2023.

The week's most damning reporting was not about armies at all. On 12 November, this newspaper carried two findings side by side: UNICEF's warning that drones have transformed Sudan's war and are killing its children, with two in three child casualties attributed to armed drones in the reporting, and the record that 71 aid workers had been killed in Sudan in a single year. On 13 November came the logistics of hunger: empty warehouses and aid stocks running out, leaving millions without shelter support. On 14 November, the World Food Programme's cuts came into focus, with about 900,000 people losing food support as funding fell short. Read together, the four items describe a war being waged, in effect, against the systems that keep civilians alive.

Children sit at the centre of that description, and a review should not flinch from it. UNICEF's James Elder reported that in the last week of October not a single day passed without a drone strike on a power station, with up to fifteen hit. Some 825,000 children under five were reported facing severe acute malnutrition. A warehouse strike at El Obeid in September destroyed more than 292,000 textbooks. Power, food, schooling: the week's evidence is that the infrastructure of a childhood is being dismantled piece by piece, largely from the air, in a war whose front lines most of its victims will never see.

South Sudan cannot read this as foreign news, and this newspaper has not treated it that way. Sudan's war sends refugees across the southern border, interrupts the oil corridor on which Juba's budget depends, and, as the Ethiopia dispute shows, militarises the whole neighbourhood's airspace. The Abyei mandate renewal, which the Security Council passed 13 to 0 on 13 November with China and Russia abstaining, extending UNISFA to November 2027, belongs in the same file: the borderland between the two Sudans remains a place the world pays to watch, because neither capital can yet guarantee it.

What would de-escalation even look like, on this week's evidence? It would start with the drones, the weapon that carried the war into substations, warehouses and a neighbouring state's airspace, and the weapon least governed by any agreement currently on the table. It would require the consulate war to reverse, since states that expel each other's diplomats do not mediate each other's ceasefires. And it would require humanitarian funding to arrive faster than warehouses empty, a race the WFP figures show is currently being lost. None of the week's reporting suggests any of the three is imminent.

That is the bleak conclusion a Sunday review is obliged to state plainly. Sudan's war is not stalemated in the sense of

standing still. It is expanding in kind, into the air, across borders and into the aid system itself, while contracting in the space it leaves for civilian life. The armies contest Kordofan towns whose names the world learns one capture at a time. The week's verified record, taken whole, describes a conflict becoming more regional, more aerial and more lethal to the unarmed, all at once.

For readers in Juba, the practical meaning is proximity. This war shares a border, a pipeline and a history with South Sudan, and its refugees, drones and diplomacy will keep arriving whether they are invited or not. Watching it clearly, naming its direction honestly, and pressing for the humanitarian access its civilians are owed are not acts of commentary. On this week's evidence, they are the minimum duties of a neighbour.

(Source: Al Jazeera / UN News — week in review)

SUNDAY ANALYSIS —

Coalitions, Successions and Sacrificed Ambitions: Africa's Politics of the Possible

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: Reuters / BBC — week in review



South African President Cyril Ramaphosa (Photo: The White House, public domain, Wikimedia Commons)

This is an analysis piece, reviewing a week of verified reporting in this newspaper's editions of 12 to 14 November. Across Africa, the week's politics were dominated by a single practical question: how do parties and leaders share, keep or hand over power when no one commands enough of it alone? South Africa's governing party chose flexible coalitions and publicly kept its president. Uganda's succession struggle turned on arrests inside the army. Kenya's opposition figures manoeuvred around unity, and its president built a broader tent. Nigeria's states voted, in effect, to share the power to police. Different countries, same arithmetic.

South Africa supplied the week's clearest statement of the new mathematics. The African National Congress, whose vote fell to 30.76 percent from 45.59 percent in 2021, ended an extended national executive meeting with a doctrine of tactical flexibility on coalitions, treating the Democratic Alliance as a partner of last resort and rejecting one-size-fits-all arrangements across 257 municipalities. When resignation reports about President Cyril Ramaphosa circulated, the party's spokesperson answered in terms that left nothing to interpret: the president is going nowhere, and the report was a fabrication. By the weekend, counting was under way in the local elections with a record 29.2 million registered voters, the electorate whose verdict started the whole argument.

The lesson sits inside the sequence. A liberation movement that once governed by majority now governs by negotiation, and its first instinct under pressure was not to change the leader but to change the method: flexibility as strategy, continuity as message. Whether that combination can survive contact with municipal coalition-making, where the DA leads in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni without majorities of its own, is the story South Africa will be telling for months. The week's reporting captures the exact moment a dominant party formally admitted dominance was over.

Uganda showed the darker version of succession politics. The BBC reporting carried in this newspaper on 14 November described at least a dozen generals and senior officers arrested over fifteen months under General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the president's son and army chief, a threatened vice-president, and a ruling party secretary-general denying reports that a leadership meeting had rejected backing Muhoozi. President Yoweri Museveni, 82, in power since 1986 and sworn in this year for a seventh term, has a son who has indicated he will seek the presidency in 2031. Where South Africa's question is how a party shares power, Uganda's is whether power can be discussed at all outside one family and one army. The arrests answer, for now, in the negative.

Kenya offered the week's most open competition, and its most revealing numbers. A TIFA survey released on 12 November put Edwin Sifuna and President William Ruto level nationally on 31 percent, with regional strongholds pulling in opposite directions, and Deputy President Kithure Kindiki the clear running-mate preference among Ruto

supporters at 55 percent. In the same week, Ruto hosted some 1,500 UDA and ODM mobilisers at State House to build a joint machine, while Kalonzo Musyoka declared himself ready to sacrifice his own ambition to unite the opposition and deny Ruto a second term, echoing Uhuru Kenyatta's call, reported on 12 November, for opposition leaders to unite behind one candidate for 2027. Both camps, in other words, are building coalitions. They are simply building them against each other.

Nigeria contributed the week's most consequential piece of constitutional engineering. Senate President Godswill Akpabio announced that about 32 of the 36 state assemblies had backed the state police amendment, well above the 24 required, raising the earlier official count of 30. State police, complementing the federal force, has been debated in Nigeria for decades as an answer to insecurity that Abuja cannot police alone. If the week's figure holds, power over policing, the most sensitive power a state can share, is about to be shared on a continental scale. It is coalition logic applied not to parties but to the federation itself.

Smaller items in the week's editions rhymed with the theme. Congo's president signed a referendum law that the opposition called a constitutional coup, a reminder that the rules of succession are themselves a battlefield. Power, all week, was being renegotiated at every level at which Africans hold it.

The pattern a Sunday review should name is this: the era of the single commanding majority is receding across very different African systems at the same time, and what replaces it is being improvised in public. Coalitions in South Africa's municipalities, a broad-based government most Kenyans told pollsters they oppose even as its architects expand it, an opposition unity project in Nairobi, a federal bargain in Abuja, a succession managed by arrest in Kampala. Some of these improvisations are democratic and some are the opposite. The week's reporting lets readers tell them apart, which is precisely its value.

For South Sudan, preparing to vote for the first time, the continental lesson is practical rather than abstract. First elections rarely produce commanding majorities, and the politics that follows them is coalition politics: negotiated, fragile and permanent. The countries in this week's news that handle that reality through rules, courts and counted votes are, not coincidentally, the ones whose successions make the inside pages. The ones that handle it through detention make the front. February's voters are choosing more than a government. They are choosing which of those two files their country will be reported in.

(Source: Reuters / BBC — week in review)

SUNDAY ANALYSIS —

Diplomacy at the Edges of Two Wars: Ukraine's Envoys and Gaza's Flooded Tents

PPP Daily Newspaper • Reporting: UN News / Reuters — week in review



Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Kyiv, Ukraine (Photo: Levchuk Volodymyr, CC BY 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

This is an analysis piece, reviewing a week of verified reporting in this newspaper's editions of 12 to 14 November. The world's two defining wars spent the week in opposite kinds of motion. Ukraine's war acquired a diplomatic itinerary, envoys moving between Abu Dhabi, Moscow and European capitals, even as attacks killed civilians and knocked out power across thirteen regions. Gaza's war acquired weather: heavy rain flooding tens of thousands of damaged shelters, in a humanitarian crisis that diplomacy has repeatedly described and repeatedly failed to relieve. One conflict is being negotiated. The other is being endured. The week's reporting held both facts at once.

Start with the movement. On 12 November, this newspaper reported that Abu Dhabi talks had yielded a prisoner release deal but no ceasefire, with envoys heading to Moscow, and that President Putin had agreed Europe could join the next round of talks, according to envoy Steve Witkoff. By 14 November, European leaders had agreed that an E5 format plus the European Union's institutions would speak for Europe in the peace talks. The G7 foreign ministers, meeting in Paris on 9 and 10 November, issued a joint declaration reaffirming support for Ukraine, calling for a ceasefire and addressing Ukraine's financing beyond 2027 and winter energy support. Prisoners exchanged, formats agreed, financing discussed: the machinery of an ending was visibly being assembled.

The week's casualty reporting is the necessary counterweight, because the war did not pause while its ending was discussed. United Nations reporting carried on 14 November recorded ten civilians killed and sixty injured in a single night and

morning, including children, a Kyiv hospital damaged with thirty people evacuated, and power disrupted in thirteen regions. Days earlier, a drone had struck an armoured humanitarian vehicle during an evacuation in Komyshuvakha, in the Zaporizhzhia region. A Sunday analysis should hold both columns of that ledger together: diplomacy is real, and so is the fact that Ukrainians were killed in their homes while it proceeded. Talks about a war are not yet the end of one.

Gaza's week had no itinerary to report, only conditions. The United Nations humanitarian report of 13 November, carried in this newspaper, recorded about 46,000 households affected by flooding since heavy rain began on 6 November, over 40,000 family shelters damaged, hundreds of alerts, and thousands of households sleeping without shelter at all, with more than 150,000 tents waiting outside Gaza ready for dispatch. Sewage-contaminated stormwater added a health risk to the exposure. In the West Bank, demolitions displaced 150 people in a week, and harvest-related settler attacks since September numbered in the hundreds. Earlier in the week, six people were killed in an Israeli airstrike on Gaza's Nasser Hospital, medics and the United Nations said, a story this newspaper carried on 13 November.

The contrast is instructive and uncomfortable. Ukraine's diplomacy works, to the extent it works, because the parties accept that the war will end by negotiation and are positioning for its terms: prisoners, formats, financing, energy. Gaza's civilians, on this week's evidence, are positioned for nothing except the next distribution and the next storm, in shelters that were already damaged before the rain arrived. Tents exist, in six figures, outside the territory. The gap between a stocked warehouse and a dry family is not logistics. It is permission, and permission is a political decision renewed or withheld every day.

Other items in the week's world reporting widened the same frame. The Security Council renewed Yemen's sanctions to 2027 and expanded maritime monitoring. Gulf shipping around Hormuz stayed fragile, with tankers catching fire after striking mines in reporting carried on 14 November, and eighteen Arab and Islamic nations condemned the strike on Nasser Medical Complex.

None of this makes the Ukraine track worthless, and a fair review should say what it is worth. Prisoner releases return real people to real families. A financing horizon beyond 2027 tells a government under attack that it will not be abandoned mid-winter. European unity of voice, laboriously formatted in Paris, removes one excuse for delay. If the Abu Dhabi and Moscow rounds produce even a partial ceasefire, the thirteen darkened regions in this week's reporting are the argument for why it cannot come too soon. Diplomacy is slow because the alternative, this week as every week, is measured in hospital evacuations.

The lesson the week offers smaller countries, including this newspaper's own, is about the value of being inside the room. Europe spent the week ensuring it would speak in the talks that decide a war on its own continent, in one format, with its institutions attached. Gaza's people had no seat at any table, and their week was reported by humanitarian clusters counting damaged shelters. Representation is not a ceremony. It is the difference between negotiating your future and having your suffering accurately documented. Both happened this week, to different peoples, in the same news cycle.

So the week ends with two images that belong together. Envoys boarding aircraft between Abu Dhabi and Moscow, carrying the paperwork of a possible peace. And families in Gaza bailing stormwater out of tents that were counted, this week, in their tens of thousands, damaged. A Sunday newspaper cannot reconcile those images, and should not pretend to. It can only place them side by side, as the week itself did, and note that the distance between diplomacy and delivery remains the defining distance in world politics.

(Source: UN News / Reuters — week in review)

PPP MESSAGE — JOIN THE PATRIOTIC PEOPLE'S PARTY

Membership registration for the Patriotic People's Party is open to South Sudanese everywhere. Register today on the PPP Members Platform at https://members.pppssd.com — or through the Membership page of this website — and stand with us for peace, justice and prosperity: one people, one nation, united beyond tribalism, with democracy, transparency and accountability, good governance and the rule of law, sustainable economic growth that reaches ordinary people, and investment in education and healthcare for every family. (This is a PPP message, not reported news.)

Patriotic People's Party — Peace, Justice and Prosperity — the Spirit of South Sudan.